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THE TWILIGHT OF THE PARDON POWER
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE *
For most of our nation’s history, the president’s constitutional pardon
power has been used with generosity and regularity to correct systemic
injustices and to advance the executive’s policy goals. Since 1980,
however, presidential pardoning has fallen on hard times, its benign
purposes frustrated by politicians’ fear of making a mistake, and subverted
by unfairness in the way pardons are granted. The diminished role of
clemency is unfortunate, since federal law makes almost no provision for
shortening a prison term and none at all for mitigating the collateral
consequences of conviction. It would be bad enough in these circumstances
if presidents had made a conscious choice not to pardon at all, or to make
only occasional symbolic use of their constitutional power. But what makes
the situation intolerable is that, as the official route to clemency has all but
closed, the back-door route has opened wide.
In the past two
administrations, petitioners with personal or political connections in the
White House bypassed the pardon bureaucracy in the Department of
Justice, disregarded its regulations, and obtained clemency by means (and
sometimes on grounds) not available to the less privileged. Much
responsibility for the disuse and disrepute into which a once-proud and
useful institution of government has fallen must be laid at the door of the
Justice Department, which has failed in its responsibilities as steward of the
pardon power, exposing the president to embarrassment and the power to
abuse. To date, President Obama has taken no steps to reform and
reinvigorate a pardon process that has, in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
words, been “drained of its moral force.”
Why has the president’s pardon power essentially ceased to function?
Is it attributable to political caution, or is there something else at work? To
find the answer, this Article first looks at pardoning practices in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a time when the pardon power
played an important operational role in the federal justice system. It
*

Law Office of Margaret Love, former U.S. Pardon Attorney (1990-1997). I am grateful
to Albert Alschuler and Samuel Morison for their helpful comments on earlier versions of
this article.
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describes how pardon evolved into parole, and how after 1930 pardon
came to be used primarily to restore rights of citizenship. It then examines
the reasons for pardon’s decline in the 1980s and its collapse in the Clinton
Administration. Finally, it argues that President Obama should want to
revive the power, and suggests how he might do it.
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost two years after taking office, President Barack Obama had yet
to issue his first pardon. 1 Almost 5,000 petitions for clemency awaited his
consideration. 2 At the same point in his presidency, Abraham Lincoln had
granted clemency to over 200 ordinary citizens and many hundreds of
soldiers. 3 In their first year in office, Presidents Theodore Roosevelt issued
134 clemency grants, Franklin Roosevelt 204, and Truman 107. 4
President Obama’s early reticence in matters of official forgiveness
should not be surprising, for it continues a trend begun in the Reagan

1

At the time this article went to press shortly after Thanksgiving 2010, President Obama
had not acted favorably on any applications for clemency, and had denied 676. Almost
5,000 petitions for pardon and commutation were pending in the Office of the Pardon
Attorney. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENTIAL
CLEMENCY
ACTIONS
BY
ADMINISTRATION:
1945
TO
PRESENT
(2010),
http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/actions_administration.htm [hereinafter OPA CLEMENCY
STATISTICS, 1945-PRESENT]. President Obama, like Presidents Bill Clinton and George W.
Bush before him, confined his first-year pardoning to the Thanksgiving turkey presented to
him by the National Turkey Federation and the Poultry and Egg National Board. See
Katherine Skiba, Turkey Gets to Duck Dinner Date: Obama Pardons “Courage” in Holiday
Ritual, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 2009, at C3; see also Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon People,
Too, Mr. President, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2010, at A17.
2
OPA CLEMENCY STATISTICS, 1945-PRESENT, supra note 1. The processing time for
pardon petitions has lengthened from months to years, and case backlogs have become
permanent. Many of the grants issued by President George W. Bush went to individuals
who had filed their petitions more than a decade earlier. See Margaret Colgate Love, Final
Report Card on Pardoning by George W. Bush 1-2 (Mar. 13, 2009) (unpublished paper,
available at http://www.pardonlaw.com/materials/FinalReportCard.3.13.09.pdf).
3
See P.S. Ruckman, Jr. & David Kincaid, Inside Lincoln’s Clemency Decision Making,
29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 84 (1999).
4
OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY
ACTIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, 1900-1945, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/actions_fiscal.htm (last
visited Oct. 13, 2010) [hereinafter OPA CLEMENCY STATISTICS, 1900-1945]; OPA
CLEMENCY STATISTICS, 1945-PRESENT, supra note 1. The annual reports of the attorney
general from 1885 through 1931 include detailed charts of each clemency grant and,
frequently, the reason or reasons that clemency was recommended. Clemency statistics
dating from the first Cleveland Administration (1885-1889) show a consistent pattern of
early first-term pardoning until the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, neither
of whom made use of their pardon power until their third year in office. See also P.S.
RUCKMAN, JR., “LAST MINUTE” PARDON SCANDALS: FACT AND FICTION 15-27 (2004),
http://pardonresearch.com/papers.htm.
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Administration that accelerated under Bill Clinton. What was once a steady
stream of presidential clemency grants has dwindled to a token few. The
process for administering the president’s power in the Department of
Justice now functions primarily to protect the handiwork of federal
prosecutors. Like his immediate predecessors and most (though by no
means all 5) current governors, President Obama appears to have concluded
that there is too little gain and too much risk in pardoning to make it a
worthwhile activity. 6
The diminished role of clemency reflects and reinforces a justice
system that has become inhumane and politicized. We live in a nation that
imprisons a higher proportion of its population than any other in the world
and that permanently stigmatizes those convicted of crime. 7 But federal
law makes almost no provision for shortening a prison term and makes no
provision at all for mitigating the collateral consequences of conviction.8
It would be bad enough if presidents had made a conscious choice not
to pardon at all or to make only occasional symbolic use of their
constitutional power. But what makes current federal pardoning practice
intolerable is that as the official route to clemency has all but closed, the
back-door route has opened wide. In the two administrations that preceded

5

A few governors have used their pardon power in recent years, some based on a
longstanding tradition of granting clemency in their state, some to ease overcrowding in their
state’s prison system, and some out of personal conviction. See e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The
Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED SENT’G REP. 153, 153-55
(2009) (discussing policies of Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, Maryland Governor
Robert Ehrlich, and Virginia Governor Tim Kaine); Gov. Jennifer Granholm OKs Clemency
for 100 Inmates in 2 Years, ASSOC. PRESS (Jan. 17, 2010), http://www.mlive.com/news/
index.ssf/2010/01/gov_jennifer_granholm_oks_clem.html
(describing
over
100
commutations granted by Michigan Governor Granholm to ease prison budget crisis). State
clemency policies and practices are beyond the scope of this article, and are described in
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL
CONVICTION:
A
STATE-BY-STATE
RESOURCE
GUIDE
(2006),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/File/Collateral%20Consequences/execsumm.pdf
[hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE].
6
It has been said that President Obama has been “too busy” in his first two years in
office to consider pardon applications. Presidents Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt had plates
at least as full at the beginning of their tenures, however, and still managed to take care of
this bit of presidential housekeeping business. A review of presidential pardoning practices
over the years suggests that something more than the press of other business has depressed
the past three presidents’ use of this most benign and personal of their constitutional powers.
7
See Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86
B.U. L. REV. 623 (2006); Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality,
and the Future of Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 857 (2009).
8
Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1722-23 (2003).
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Obama’s, petitioners with personal or political connections to the
presidency bypassed the pardon bureaucracy in the Department of Justice,
disregarded its regulations, and obtained clemency by means (and
sometimes on grounds) not available to the less privileged. The
Department of Justice invited these end runs by refusing to take seriously
its responsibilities as presidential advisor in clemency matters, by exposing
President Clinton to charges of cronyism, and then President Bush to
charges of incompetence. The two presidents are also at fault: in
confirming popular beliefs about pardon’s irregularity and unfairness, they
disserved both the institution of the presidency and their own legacies. To
date, President Obama has taken no steps to reform and reinvigorate a
pardon process that has, in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s words, been
“drained of its moral force.” 9
Who hijacked the president’s pardon power? Is it worth rescuing, or
should it be left to wither away in peace? To find the answers, Part II of
this Article looks at pardoning practices in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, a time when pardon played an important operational
role in the federal justice system. It describes how pardon evolved into
parole, and how in an age of indeterminate sentencing pardon came to be
used primarily to restore rights of citizenship. Part III examines the reasons
for pardon’s decline in the 1980s and its collapse in the Clinton
Administration. Part IV argues that President Obama should want to revive
the power and suggests how he might do it.
II. PUBLIC MERCY FROM 1789 TO 1980
In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton justified giving the
president exclusive control of the “benign prerogative of pardoning” in
terms of two great public purposes: to temper the law’s harsh results as a
matter of compassion and to intercede to defuse a politically inflammatory
situation. 10 As to the first of these purposes, Hamilton observed that
“without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice
would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.” 11 With respect to the

9

Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at the American
Bar Association (Aug. 9, 2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 126, 128 (2003). Pointing
out that pardons have “become infrequent,” Justice Kennedy opined that “[a] people
confident in its laws and institutions should not be ashamed of mercy.” Id.; see also Dretke
v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 399 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Among its benign if too-often
ignored objects, the clemency power can correct injustices that the ordinary criminal process
seems unable or unwilling to consider.”).
10
THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
11
Id.; see also Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in DOUGLAS
HAY ET AL., ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN 18TH CENTURY ENGLAND 44
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second, he proposed that “in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are
often critical moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents
or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth.”12 In a
government otherwise of limited powers, there was to be no check on the
president’s prerogative but public opinion.13
Examples of pardon used as a tool of statecraft abound in American
history, often linked to wartime exigency or post-war amnesties. George
Washington granted his first pardons in 1794 to Pennsylvania farmers
challenging the federal government’s power to tax whiskey. 14 Sixty years
later, Abraham Lincoln used the pardon power to bring a measured end to
another dangerous internal rebellion, this time involving the “largest
massacre of whites by Indians in American history.” 15 Presidents since
Thomas Jefferson have issued post-war pardons to deserters and draft
evaders 16 and issued pardons to signal their disagreement with a law. 17
(1975) (“[The pardon] moderated the barbarity of the criminal law in the interests of
humanity. It was erratic and capricious, but a useful palliative until Parliament reformed the
law in the nineteenth century.”).
12
THE FEDERALIST, NO. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
13
While the prospect of punishment at the polls or impeachment may have no persuasive
value for a president at the end of his term, the Framers believed that the president would
always be restrained by the risk of what James Iredell called “the damnation of his fame to
all future ages.” JAMES IREDELL, ADDRESS IN THE NORTH CAROLINA RATIFYING CONVENTION
(1788), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, at 380-82 (Bernard Bailyn, ed.,
1993). The political checks on the pardon power have collectively been called “limited and
clumsy.” LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-10, at 721 (3d ed.
2000). Even sixty years ago when pardoning was frequent and routine, the only systematic
study of the federal pardon power noted the “persistence of erroneous ideas, the lack of exact
information, and the absence of publicity concerning the acts of the pardoning authority
envelop the power in a veil of mystery.” W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE
PRESIDENT 6 (1941).
14
See JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 55-56 (2009). After the socalled Whiskey Rebellion had ended peacefully with the ringleaders pardoned individually
and the other insurgents granted amnesty, Washington explained to Congress that his
pardons had been motivated both by mercy and the public interest: “[I]t appears to me no
less consistent with the public good than it is with my personal feelings to mingle in the
operations of Government every degree of moderation and tenderness which the national
justice, dignity, and safety may permit.” President George Washington, Seventh Annual
Address (Dec. 8, 1795), in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 184 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1896).
15
DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 392 (1995). Lincoln sent troops to quell the Sioux
uprising in Minnesota, and later personally reviewed a list of 303 men condemned to death
by military tribunal, commuting all but thirty-eight of them, provoking public outrage. See
Ruckman & Kincaid, supra note 3, at 87-88.
16
Madison issued amnesties on three separate occasions during the War of 1812 to
persuade deserters from the army to return to service. See AMNESTY IN AMERICA 24 (Morris
Sherman ed., 1974). Lincoln approved amnesties for Confederate rebels during the Civil
War in an effort to co-opt them to the Union side, while Andrew Johnson issued amnesties
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Pardon has also figured in such politically divisive issues as labor
organizing, race relations, polygamy, and Puerto Rican independence.18

after the conclusion of hostilities to promote national healing. See CROUCH, supra note 14,
at 40-43. Theodore Roosevelt pardoned participants in the Philippine insurrection, see
Proclamation 483 (July 4, 1902), and Warren Harding pardoned Eugene V. Debs and others
convicted of subverting military recruitment during World War I. CROUCH, supra note 14, at
56-57. Harry Truman issued proclamations pardoning ex-convicts who had served in the
armed forces during World War II and the Korean War, see Proclamation 2676, 10 Fed. Reg.
15,409 (Dec, 24, 1945) and Proclamation 3000, 17 Fed. Reg. 11,833 (Dec. 24, 1952), and
1,523 individuals convicted of Selective Service Act violations who had been recommended
for pardon by a presidentially appointed three-person “Amnesty Board.” See Proclamation
2762, 12 Fed. Reg. 8,731 (Dec. 24, 1947); Executive Order 9814 (Dec. 23, 1946).
Presidents Ford and Carter pardoned persons guilty of military and selective service
violations following the Vietnam War. See generally U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1975); Proclamation 4483, 3 C.F.R. § 4 (1978). As one pardon
scholar has observed, “pardons are a better signal than an armistice agreement to show that a
war is truly over and that peace is restored.” KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE,
MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 51 (1989).
17
For example, Jefferson pardoned some of those convicted under the Alien and Sedition
Acts because he considered these acts unconstitutional. See P.S. Ruckman, Jr., THE
PARDONING POWER: THE OTHER “CIVICS LESSON” 9 (2001), http://pardonresearch.com/
papers/7.pdf. Woodrow Wilson, whose veto had failed to prevent passage of the Volstead
Act, pardoned dozens of liquor law violators. Id. at 7-8. A similar dislike of a law was
behind Clinton’s last-day pardon of people prosecuted under the Independent Counsel Act.
See Amy Goldstein & Susan Schmidt, Clinton’s Last-Day Clemency Benefits 176; List
Includes Pardons for Cisneros, McDougal, Deutch and Roger Clinton, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,
2001, at A1 (“Clinton appeared to be tying up loose ends from many of the independent
counsel investigations that had daunted him and several senior members of his
administration virtually from the beginning of his tenure.”). In the 1960s, John Kennedy and
Lyndon Johnson together commuted the prison sentences of more than 300 drug offenders,
laying the groundwork for repeal of mandatory minimum sentencing laws in the 1970s. See
1963 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 62-63 (1963); 1964 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 64 (1964); see also
Margaret Colgate Love, Reinventing the President’s Pardon Power, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 5,
6 (2007) (“In a more recent ‘systematic’ use of the power evidently intended to send a
message to Congress, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson commuted the sentences of more
than 200 drug offenders serving mandatory minimum sentences under the Narcotics Control
Act of 1956.”); Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: Systematic Pardons, 13 FED.
SENT’G RPT. 139, 141-43 (2001) (describing how clemency can be used systematically to
create and spur policy changes).
18
See CROUCH, supra note 14, at 56-60 (discussing clemency grants to Eugene Debs,
Jimmy Hoffa, Oscar Collazo, Marcus Garvey, and FALN Puerto Rican nationalists). James
Buchanan pardoned Mormon participants in the Utah War of 1857-1858, see Donna G.
Ramos, Utah War: U.S. Government Versus Mormon Settlers, http://www.historynet.com/
utah-war-us-government-versus-mormon-settlers.htm (last visited August 27, 2010), and
Benjamin Harrison and Grover Cleveland later pardoned Mormon polygamists to smooth the
path to Utah’s statehood. Bonnie K. Goodman, January 4 1986: Utah is Admitted as the
45th State of the Union, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK, Jan. 1, 2008, http://hnn.us/
blogs/entries/46038.html.
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Arguably the most famous statecraft pardon is Gerald Ford’s of Richard
Nixon.
While the tradition of clemency as statecraft is an important and
enduring one in this country, this Article is concerned with the equally
important tradition of clemency as a tool of justice to make “exceptions in
favor of unfortunate guilt.” 19
A. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PARDON POWER BEFORE 1870

From the earliest years of the Republic, pardon was used to benefit
ordinary people for whom the results of a criminal prosecution were
considered unduly harsh or unfair. This kind of low-level pardoning took
place largely out of the public eye, but with some regularity. Presidents
spent what seems today like a great deal of their time in office considering
pardon requests, which frequently came from judges forced to apply laws
they regarded as excessively harsh. 20 Presidents granted clemency to a high
percentage of those who asked for it, forestalling or halting prosecutions,
cutting short prison sentences or remitting them entirely, forgiving fines and
forfeitures, and occasionally restoring citizenship rights lost as a result of
conviction.
The secretary of state was the official custodian of pardon documents,
but the presidents generally relied on their attorneys general for advice
about how and when to exercise their constitutional power. Access to the
president’s mercy sometimes depended upon personal or political

19

See Kennedy, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See generally George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences
and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790-1850, 16 FED. SENT’G
REP. 212 (2004).
20

The pardon archives disclose that, in the early federal justice system, the President played an
important and active role in making what Alexander Hamilton called “exceptions in favor of
unfortunate guilt,” often at the behest of a federal judge frustrated by the severity of the penalty
he had been required by law to impose. Judges urged the President to intervene not only in
capital cases, but also in cases involving mandatory fines (which had to be paid before a person
could be released) and prison terms.
Often defendants would petition the sentencing court directly for clemency, giving the judge an
opportunity to send the petition on to the President with a recommendation. Occasionally judges
took the initiative in approaching the President rather than rely on the cumbersome machinery of
law. Such early judicial activism was particularly evident in District of Columbia cases prior to
1831, and in cases involving employee mail theft.

Id. Recently some judges, compelled by mandatory sentencing laws to impose sentences
they regard as too harsh, have resumed the practice of recommending clemency at the time
of sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1991)
(expressing support for trial judge’s recommendation that life sentence for drug trafficking
be commuted after fifteen years). See generally Joanna M. Huang, Correcting Mandatory
Injustice: Judicial Recommendation of Executive Clemency, 60 DUKE. L. J. 131 (2010).

1176

MARGARET COLGATE LOVE

[Vol. 100

connections, and early pardon warrants reveal that the president frequently
gave weight to “respectable testimonials” about a pardon petitioner’s
former good character from prominent citizens. 21 Thomas Jefferson began
the practice of routinely seeking the views of district attorneys and judges,
declaring that “[n]o pardon is granted in any case but on the
recommendation of the judges who sat on the trial & who best know &
estimate the degree of the crime, & character and deportment of the
criminal.” 22 Later presidents would continue this practice.23 Reasons for
pardon were occasionally spelled out in pardon warrants, though James
Polk was the first president to adopt this practice on a systematic basis. 24
The informal and idiosyncratic system for administering the pardon
power that prevailed in the first half of the nineteenth century began to
crystallize in 1852 when Daniel Webster, Millard Fillmore’s Secretary of
State, formally handed over responsibility for investigating and making
recommendations on clemency petitions to Attorney General William

21

See, e.g., Lardner & Love, supra note 20, at 219.
See id. at 220, n.21 (citing Jefferson’s statement in National Archives and Records
Administration, Petitions for Pardon - 1789-1860, Record Group 59//893, box 2, file 104).
23
See HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 86-88. The requirement to seek the advice of the
relevant United States Attorney in every case was spelled out in Justice Department
clemency regulations between 1898 and 1946 (clemency regulations dating from 1898
available from the Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice). After 1962,
the requirement was no longer in the clemency regulations, though the pardon attorney
invariably seeks the recommendation of the U.S. Attorney and judge when favorable
consideration is being considered. See Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the
Moral Justification of Executive Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 39 (2005) (“[I]f the
background investigation suggests that a pardon may warranted [sic], or in cases which are
of particular importance or in which significant factual questions persist, the Pardon
Attorney requests input from the prosecuting authority and the sentencing judge concerning
the merits of the petition.”).
24
Journalist George Lardner, Jr., is preparing a comprehensive history of presidential
clemency based on extensive research in State Department and Presidential archives, and he
has generously shared with me several draft chapters of his untitled manuscript. Most of the
information about pardoning prior to 1858 comes from the chapter tentatively titled “A
Golden Age for the Pardon Power.” Lardner reports that Polk “was his own pardon
attorney,” who
22

wrote careful notes, demanding copies of indictments and court records, insisting on reports from
judges and district attorneys . . . . His pardons often provided harsh glimpses of the justice
system, setting out a judges admissions about the unreliability of a key prosecution witness in
one case, a jury’s belated discovery of false testimony in another, and in yet another the
incompetence of a steamboat inspection that left a crippled captain facing civil prosecution
because his boiler exploded.

Id. at 341 (citations omitted).
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Crittenden. 25 Under President Buchanan, a pardon clerk was appointed to
assist the attorney general in his new administrative responsibilities.26
During the Civil War, President Lincoln’s inclination to be merciful
and his sensitivity to the pardon’s political usefulness were the source of
some frustration to his generals—though his pardoning apparently inspired
the troops. 27 He once spared the lives of sixty-two deserters in a single
order 28 and wrote to General George Meade that he was “unwilling for any
boy under eighteen to be shot.” 29 General William T. Sherman complained
to the Judge Advocate General that Lincoln found it “very hard . . . to hang
spies,” reporting that he intended “to execute a good many spies and
guerrillas—without . . . bothering the President.” 30 President Lincoln spent
long hours reviewing clemency requests from soldiers and their families,31
and famously entertained pardon petitioners at the White House.

25

See HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 149 (1937). The State
Department had previously processed clemency applications, but in 1858, Secretary of State
Daniel Webster and Attorney General John Crittenden agreed that “petitions should pass
entirely into the Attorney General’s charge, although warrants should still issue from the
State Department.” Id. President Cleveland transferred authority to issue pardon warrants to
the Justice Department by executive order in 1893. See Lardner & Love, supra note 20, at
220 n.21 (citing Exec. Order of June 16, 1893 (on file at the Office of the Pardon Attorney)).
26
See Lardner, supra note 24, at 351 (citing NARS RG 204/10/A/344); see also Act of
March 8, 1865, ch. 98, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 516 (authorizing employment of a pardon clerk
at a salary of $1,800 per year).
27
A popular poem of 1863 recited a fanciful tale of Lincoln’s pardon of William Scott, a
soldier sentenced to death for sleeping on sentry duty. FRANCIS DE HAES JAVIER, THE
SLEEPING SENTINEL: AN INCIDENT IN VERSE 16 (1863) (“He came to save that stricken soul,
now waking from despair; and from a thousand voices rose a shout which rent the air! The
pardoned soldier understood the tones of jubilee, and, bounding from his fetters, blessed the
hand that made him free!”). In 1870, Harper’s Weekly published a full-page illustration of
Lincoln arriving at the place of Scott’s scheduled execution barely in time to save his life,
and in 1914, Scott’s pardon became the plot of a silent motion picture. THE SLEEPING
SENTINEL (Lubin Manufacturing Company 1914); see also William Scott (The Sleeping
Sentinel), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Scott_(The_Sleeping_Sentinel)
(last visited March 7, 2010 ).
28
See Ruckman & Kincaid, supra note 3, at 85 (citing BELL IRVIN WILEY, THE LIFE OF
BILLY YANK: THE COMMON SOLDIER OF THE UNION 216 (1972)). A total of 267 men were
executed by the military authorities during the Civil War, and 141 of them were deserters. J.
T. Dorris, President Lincoln’s Clemency, 20 J. ILL. ST. HIST. SOC’Y 547, 553 (1953).
29
CARL SANDBURG, 3 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE WAR YEARS 476 (1939).
30
Dorris, supra note 28, at 550 (citing 7 WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICIAL RECORDS OF
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 18-19 (1897)). When asked on another occasion how
he was able to execute court-marshaled offenders without presidential interference, Sherman
replied, “I shot them first.” Ruckman & Kincaid, supra note 3, at 85 (citing RICHARD N.
CURRENT, THE LINCOLN NOBODY KNOWS 169 (1958)).
31
See, e.g., INSIDE LINCOLN’S WHITE HOUSE: THE COMPLETE CIVIL WAR DIARY OF JOHN
HAY 64 (Michael Burlingame & John R. Turner eds., 1997) (describing a six-hour session in
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While Lincoln’s military pardons are the stuff of legend, he also issued
331 clemency warrants to people convicted in the civilian courts. Attorney
General Edward Bates, the embodiment of an emerging institutional
impulse to manage the practice of pardoning, worked hard to control access
to the president and keep track of those to whom he made promises. Pardon
Clerk Edmund Stedman reported, “My chief, Attorney General Bates, soon
discovered that my most important duty was to keep all but the most
deserving cases from coming before the kind Mr. Lincoln at all; since there
was nothing harder for him to do than put aside a prisoner’s
application . . . .” 32 Indeed, the Attorney General declared that President
Lincoln was “unfit to be trusted with the pardoning power,” partly because
he was too susceptible to women’s tears. 33 Lincoln accepted advice from
all quarters, and frequently provided explicit and detailed reasons for
clemency decisions in the warrants themselves. 34 At the same time, he
approved many capital sentences, in one case rejecting a petition for
clemency signed by ninety-one members of Congress. 35
B. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND THE PARDON POWER, 1870-1930

A regime in which a petitioner could appear personally before the
president to plead for a pardon became unthinkable after the Civil War as
the federal justice system grew in size and complexity. Attorney General
Bates and General Sherman were also probably correct in complaining that
a system based on personal access made it too difficult for a president to
say no and too easy for individuals with a personal or political agenda to

which Lincoln eagerly “caught at any fact which would justify him in saving the life of a
condemned soldier”).
32
Dorris, supra note 28, at 550 (citing LAURA STEDMAN & GEORGE M. GOULD, 1 LIFE
AND LETTERS OF EDMUND CLARENCE STEDMAN 265 (1910)).
33
RICHARD N. CURRENT, THE LINCOLN NOBODY KNOWS 169 (1958). People joked that
enterprising merchants in the District of Columbia rented weeping children and widow’s
weeds to the mothers of condemned soldiers before their audiences with the President. See
WILLIAM E. BARTON, 2 THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 255 (1925).
34
Ruckman & Kincaid, supra note 3, at 93-94. Ruckman and Kincaid conclude that
Lincoln used “the clemency decision-making process as a way to win the respect and support
of the citizenry.” Id. at 95. Petitioners were evidently well-advised to stop on Capitol Hill
and other governmental centers on their way to the White House, for Lincoln’s clemency
warrants noted the support of U.S. Senators (15 warrants); members of Congress (14
warrants); governors (12 warrants); judges, including one Supreme Court Justice (73
warrants); prosecutors (78 warrants); and prison officials (44 warrants). Id. at 93-94. They
also noted the support of former public officials, state legislators, mayors, aldermen,
generals, the Vice President, and many ordinary citizens. Id. The clemency warrant of one
offender, for example, recited the endorsement of a “large majority” of the Pennsylvania
legislature and “several thousand citizens.” Id. at 94.
35
Dorris, supra note 28, at 554.
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influence the exercise of the president’s power. The solution to both
problems was to place the administration of the pardon power firmly and
exclusively in the hands of the attorney general. This made sense not only
to avoid compromising the president or wasting his time, but also to ensure
that the pardon power would be able to function as an integral part of the
justice system.
The administrative system formalized after the Department of Justice
was established in 1870 made the unruly power part of the more general
transformation of the justice system to an administrative state, steering most
clemency suitors away from the president’s door for over 100 years. At this
time, the attorney general also became responsible for the proper care of
federal prisoners, then mostly housed in state facilities, and he made it a
priority to ensure their access to the clemency process. In 1880, he reported
that:
A system of regular inspection has been instituted whereby prisoners are visited as
often as once in six months, with a view of ascertaining from personal observation
their treatment and their wants. These visits are made by a representative of this
department, and he has personal interviews with the prisoners, individually and alone,
in order to determine whether there were just grounds of complaint of the discipline to
which they were subjected. I have every reason to believe that he has carefully and
humanely performed his duty in the matter. He has also been instructed to bring,
through this department, to the attention of the President, consideration of any case
which seems to require executive clemency toward sick or friendless prisoners who
might otherwise have no means of communicating with the pardoning power. A
system of forms has been prepared by this officer by which all jails and prisons are
required to furnish monthly reports with full particulars as to prisoners of the United
36
States in their charge.

In 1887, Clerk of Pardons Alexander Boteler reported to Congress on
the general handling of pardon applications: “Every application for pardon
addressed to the President is referred to the Attorney-General and by him to
the clerk of pardons for his prompt and appropriate attention.”37 In turn, he
reported, the “clerk of pardons” asked the United States Attorneys and
judges for their views, continuing the practice begun by President Jefferson,
and then made a full report to the attorney general, always being careful “to
accord to the convict all that he may be fairly entitled to have said in his
favor.” The attorney general, having thus been provided with “an impartial
representation of the case,” then sent the president his recommendation as
to whether pardon should be granted or not. If it was “the pleasure of the
President to grant the pardon asked for,” the attorney general prepared a
36

1880-1881 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 20 (1881).
Lardner, supra note 24, at 509 (quoting from an April 1887 report to “a Select Senate
Committee interested in how the public business was being conducted,” Report 507, Part 3,
50th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-23).
37
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pardon warrant, which was copied out at the state department, signed by the
president, and forwarded to the pardon clerk for delivery to its recipient. If
the president declined to grant a pardon, the applicant was so informed. 38
By President Cleveland’s second term, it had become the practice for the
official who was by then called the “pardon attorney” 39 to deny petitions
without sending them on to the president if neither the prosecutor nor the
judge had recommended favorably. 40 In most years, this meant that about
300 petitions were sent to the president. 41
Beginning in President Cleveland’s first term (1885-1889), the reasons
for each pardon recommendation were published in the Annual Reports of
the Attorney General, a practice that would continue until 1931. The
attorney general at the time was Augustus Garland, famously the recipient
of a post-Civil War pardon, 42 and he took a personal interest in pardon
cases. 43 During the second Cleveland Administration (1893-1897), the
President worked directly with the pardon attorney, cutting the attorney
general out of the process entirely, and wrote out lengthy justifications for
pardon in more than 714 cases. President Cleveland’s detailed and highly
personal reasons for pardon offer a fascinating window into the primitive
legal system of the time and the thoughtful approach of this most forgiving
president. 44

38

Id.
In March 1891, the position “clerk of pardons” was redesignated “the attorney in
charge of pardons,” at which time Congress established the Office of the Pardon Attorney as
a separate component within the Justice Department. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 541, 26
Stat. 946.
40
1897 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 180 (1897) (Report of the Pardon Attorney) (“[C]ases in
which neither the United States attorney nor the trial judge recommended clemency are not
considered by the President unless it is apparent that the health of the convict will be very
seriously impaired by further confinement.”).
41
See generally 1885-1931 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (1885-1931). In 1897, for example,
669 petitions for clemency were received by the Attorney General, of which 334 were sent
on to the President with a recommendation. 1897 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 179 (1897). Of
those 334 petitions, 224 were granted by the President: 98 unconditional pardons, 5
conditional pardons, 80 sentence commutations, 31 pardons “for the purpose of restoring
citizenship,” 5 remissions of fine and 5 respites. Id. One hundred and ten petitions were
denied. Id.
42
Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1866).
43
For example, Attorney General Garland expanded the annual reports that the attorneys
general had been sending to Congress since 1873 to include a full account of each pardon
grant, and spelling out the justification for his recommendation in each case. See 1885
ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (1885). The practice of publishing reasons for each clemency grant
in the annual report of the attorney general continued until 1932, when it was discontinued at
the direction of President Roosevelt.
44
See 1893-1897 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (1893-1897). Cleveland personally denied
another 516 cases, allowing more than 750 applications to die without action at the Justice
39
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The first formal clemency rules approved by President McKinley in
1898 incorporated the same basic features that had evolved less formally
under President Cleveland: all clemency petitions were filed in the first
instance with the attorney general; the pardon attorney then sent each one
promptly to the United States Attorney, who was responsible for making a
recommendation and also soliciting the judge’s; and any pardon application
that failed to attract official support could be denied by the pardon attorney
without being sent to the president. 45 Given the requirement of a favorable
recommendation from the prosecutor, it may be surprising (at least to
anyone accustomed to the present-day hostility of prosecutors toward
clemency) to see that in most years between 1900 and 1936, more than half
of the thousands of petitions filed were sent forward to the White House

Department. In several early cases, he made clear his dislike of the primitive federal law of
murder, which knew no degrees. See 1885 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 344 (1885) (granting
commutations to Mason Holcomb, William Dickson, Frederick Ray, and Williams
Meadows, all sentenced to hang in the District of Arkansas by the notorious hanging judge
Isaac Parker). In one case during his second term, President Cleveland explained his
commutation of Thomas Taylor’s death sentence as follows:
In disposing of this case I am not able to rest my action upon the far too common allegation of
insanity, nor upon the theory of accidental or unintentional homicide, both of which pleas have
been strongly urged on behalf of the convict as well as upon his trial as upon his application for
Executive clemency. This commutation is granted upon the ground that, in my opinion, there
has not been presented in the case such distinct and satisfactory evidence of premeditation as
should characterize the crime of murder in the first degree, and because I think it can fairly be
assumed from the facts developed that the discovery by the convict just prior to the homicide of
the recent and flagrant infidelity of his wife so affected him that he took her life in an instant of
blind passion and terrible rage. This case presents another illustration of the desirability of a
classification of murder into degrees in the District of Columbia, as has been done with good
results in some of the States.

1896 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 182-83 (1896). In another 1896 case, involving one Eugene
LeBoeuf, who had been convicted in the Eastern District of New York of sending obscene
pictures through the mail and sentenced to two years in Kings County penitentiary, the
President noted that,
Though I find it exceedingly difficult to extend any measure of clemency in a case involving the
despicable crime of which this convict was confessedly guilty, yet I think that this is an exceptional
case of its class. The convict has already been imprisoned fourteen months, his character prior to
his arrest was good, and he was of industrious habits; but I confess I am more influenced by the
sufferings and privations which his longer incarceration would bring upon his innocent and
dependent wife and child.

Id. at 190.
45
See “Rules Relating to Applications for Pardon,” February 3, 1898, at Rules 1, 3, 4
(signed by President William McKinley and Attorney General John Griggs) (on file with
Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,) [hereinafter McKinley Rules]; see also
Kennedy, supra note 9.
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with a favorable official recommendation.46 At the White House, the
president usually approved cases recommended favorably by the Attorney
General, and sometimes was more inclined to leniency. In 1932, Attorney
General William Mitchell commented in a speech to the American Bar
Association on the tension that sometimes arose between Justice
Department prosecutors, determined to enforce the criminal laws severely,
and President Hoover, a veteran practitioner of humanitarian relief:
Reviewing the past three years, I believe that it is in respect to pardons that President
Hoover has most often shown an inclination to disagree with the Department of
Justice. I suspect he thinks we are too rigid. The pitiful result of criminal misconduct
is that the burden of misery falls most heavily on the women and children. If
executive clemency were granted in all cases of suffering families, the result would be
a general jail delivery, so we have to steel ourselves against such appeals. President
Hoover, with a human sympathy born of his great experiences in the relief of human
misery, has now and again, not for great malefactors but for humble persons in cases
you never heard of, been inclined to disagree with the prosecutor’s viewpoint and
47
extend mercy. We have been glad when such incidents occurred.

The clemency process also appears to have been extremely efficient,
judging by the many petitioners who gained release prior to the expiration
of prison sentences that were measured in months rather than years. 48 This
bears emphasis in light of present-day case backlogs: hundreds of petitions
were fully processed each year by the pardon attorney and a handful of
assistants, and promptly decided by the president.49
The attorney general’s practice of reporting the reasons for each
clemency recommendation tells a grim story about federal justice in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, suggesting that little progress had
been made toward the humane and efficient system that Enlightenment
philosophers had expected would eliminate the need for pardon. At a time
when basic principles of culpability were still loosely defined, and courts
had only limited authority to review a jury’s guilty verdict or vary statutory
penalties, 50 pardon performed a variety of important error-correcting and
46

See HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 108, tbl.2 (Applications for Clemency Disposed of
Without the Participation of the President in Relation to the Total Applications Disposed of
During the Year 1900-1936).
47
HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 121 (quoting Address, Reform in Criminal Procedure,
October 13, 1932).
48
Before the 1920s, it is hard to find a court-imposed prison sentence longer than five
years in the attorney general’s clemency charts; even in the 1920s, prison sentences as long
as ten years were relatively infrequent. See 1885-1931 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (1885-1931).
49
See HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 91-92 (describing the allocation of responsibility
among the seven people in the Office of the Pardon Attorney in 1940, a relatively typical
year in which 1293 applications were received and 270 grants were issued).
50
In 1879, circuit courts were empowered to issue writs of error on a discretionary basis,
Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354, and a variety of procedural devices, including
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justice-enhancing functions that are nowadays played by courts, and was
accordingly valued almost as much by prosecutors and judges as it was by
criminal defendants. 51 Indeed, one authority on nineteenth century
pardoning has concluded, based on archival research and the reasons given
by the attorney general for recommending pardon, that prosecutors and
judges relied upon the easy availability of clemency to excuse a somewhat
less than rigorous attention paid to due process and a hands-off approach to
jury verdicts. 52 Between 1885 and 1931, 181 pardon recommendations
were based in whole or in part upon “doubt as to guilt,” 52 cited
“insufficient evidence” to support conviction, 93 announced that grantees
were innocent or the victims of mistaken identification, and 46 noted the
“dying confession of the real murderer.” 53
Some reasons given for granting pardon during this period would in
time become recognized as legal defenses: lack of capacity, duress,
insanity, and a variety of other mitigating circumstances or excuses that the
jury had either been unaware of or ignored. Others reflect operational
considerations relating to age and health (fear of contagion was as likely as
imminent death to qualify a prisoner for early release), immigration status
(to facilitate or avert deportation), or cooperation with the government
(either to reward it or secure it). Sometimes pardon was recommended for
reasons that seem quaint (e.g., “to enable petitioner to catch steamer without
delay,” “to enable farmer prisoner to save his crops,” “not of criminal

writs of habeas corpus, motions for a new trial, and certificates of division, allowed some
appellate review even before 1879. See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right
to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 531-43 (1992). In 1889 federal defendants
sentenced to death gained the right to appeal. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655,
656. In 1891, other defendants convicted of serious crimes gained the same right. Act of
March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826.
51
The sympathy of prosecutors toward pardon was replicated in the states. See, e.g.,
James D. Barnett, The Grounds of Pardon, 17 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 490,
505 (1927) (quoting H. B. Tedrow, State Board of Pardons of Colorado, 1911 Proceedings of
the Annual Congress of the American Prison Association 300-01) (“I have read dozens of
communications from judges saying their sentences in specific cases were too severe . . . .
District attorneys time and again tell us that particular sentences are excessive and thus
confess that a well-intended prosecution was transformed into an unintended persecution.”).
52
See Lardner, supra note 24, at 514 (“Many federal prosecutors and judges across the
country were still accustomed to literal application of the laws that could then be ameliorated
by recommending a pardon.”). A similar willingness among eighteenth century English
judges to impose harsh laws with an expectation of a later pardon has been described by
Douglas Hay. Hay, supra note 11, at 23 (“Parliament intended their legislation to be strictly
enforced, and . . . the judges increasingly vitiated that intention by extending pardons
freely.”). See generally 1885-1910 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (reasons given for pardons);
HUMBERT, supra note 13, at tbls.5 & 6.
53
HUMBERT, supra note 13, at tbls.5 & 6.
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type”) or alarming (“mental infirmity of judge”). 54 Other frequently cited
reasons involve the petitioner’s “previous good character,” the destitute
circumstances of his wife and children, and the reputation and influence of
those supporting clemency.
Pardons during this period were also used to signal the need for law
reform. In addition to President Wilson’s famous sympathy with liquor law
violators, 55 many acts of clemency prefigured defenses that would
eventually be enacted into law. For example, the first federal murder
statute, part of the initial Federal Criminal Code of 1790, did not divide
murder into degrees, and it declared the crime punishable by death. 56
Proposals to treat unpremeditated murder as a non-capital offense were
heeded only in 1909, 57 but in the meantime, Presidents Cleveland, Theodore
Roosevelt, and Taft reviewed the records in capital cases and commuted the
death sentences of murderers who they concluded had not premeditated
their crimes. 58 A 1939 Justice Department study took note of pardon’s role
in hastening the development of legal reforms:
[Pardon] has been the tool by which many of the most important reforms in the
substantive criminal law have been introduced. Ancient law was much more static
and rigid than our own. As human judgment came to feel that a given legal rule,
subjecting a person to punishment under certain circumstances, was unjust, almost the
only available way to avoid the rule was by pardon . . . . Quickly pardons on such
grounds became a matter of course; and from there to the recognition of such

54

Id. at 124-33.
See Ruckman, supra note 17.
56
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, 3, reprinted in 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2215 (1970) (declaring
“wilful murder” “within . . . any . . . place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States” to be punishable by death).
57
See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 273, 275, 35 Stat. 1143. For one complaint about
Congress’s failure to divide the crime of murder into degrees, see 1896 ATT’Y GEN. ANN.
REP. xvii-xviii (1896).
58
See HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 125 tbl.5. President Cleveland explained his 1896
commutation of Thomas Taylor’s death sentence as follows:
55

In disposing of this case I am not able to rest my action upon the far too common allegation of
insanity, nor upon the theory of accidental or unintentional homicide, both of which pleas have
been strongly urged on behalf of the convict as well as upon his trial as upon his application for
Executive clemency. This commutation is granted upon the ground that, in my opinion, there
has not been presented in the case such distinct and satisfactory evidence of premeditation as
should characterize the crime of murder in the first degree, and because I think it can fairly be
assumed from the facts developed that the discovery by the convict just prior to the homicide of
the recent and flagrant infidelity of his wife so affected him that he took her life in an instant of
blind passion and terrible rage. This case presents another illustration of the desirability of the
classification of murder into degrees in the District of Columbia, as has been done with good
results in some of the states.

1896 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 182-83 (1896).
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circumstances as a defense was only a short step. This is what happened with self59
defense, insanity, and infancy, to mention only three well known examples.

The range of reasons given for favorable pardon recommendations in
the attorney general reports reveal not only that pardon functioned as an
integral part of the justice system, but also that its exercise (much like the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion) was frequently informed by an
idiosyncratic sense of compassion. Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte
observed in 1908 that:
I have always considered with especial care the possible claims to clemency of
unenlightened and apparently friendless criminals, particularly those whose crimes
might have been the fruits of sudden and violent passion, ignorance, poverty, or
unhappy surroundings and to deal less favorably with applications on behalf of
offenders enjoying at the time of the crime good social position, material comforts,
60
the benefits of education, and a happy domestic life.

In 1897, Grover Cleveland’s very last pardon went to a postal thief
who he opined was “not entitled to the least clemency.” 61 However, the
prisoner had “a wife and 8 children who are in a destitute condition, and the
situation is made more pitiable by the fact that the wife has lately had a
stroke of paralysis, from which there is no hope of her recovery.” 62 Noting
that a job awaited the prisoner that would enable him to care for his family,
the President declared, “[T]his pardon is granted solely on their account.” 63
The number of grants each year is staggering in light of the relatively
small number of federal defendants. The Annual Reports of the Attorney
General for the years between 1885 and 1930 reveal that the presidents
issued more than 10,000 grants of clemency during this forty-five-year

59

See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 3 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE
PROCEDURES: PARDON 295-96 (1939) [hereinafter 3 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES].
60
1908 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 8 (1908). Unfortunately, after 1931 these fascinating
records were no longer compiled and published, ostensibly for reasons of efficiency but
more likely because of President Roosevelt’s preference for confidentiality in the pardon
process, and they exist now only in the uncatalogued letters of advice signed by the Attorney
General available from the National Archives and Records Administration.
61
1896 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 187-88 (1896).
62
Id.
63
1897 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 187-88 (1897); see also id. at 191, granting commutation
to an individual convicted of counterfeiting and sentenced to six months in prison:
The sentence of his convict was so unaccountably lenient and his guilt was so clear that no
consideration arising out of the facts of the case as they are related to the convict himself would
incline me to interfere with his punishment.
I can not, however, close my heart to the distressing representation that very lately and since the
imprisonment of the convict his wife has died, leaving motherless a large family of small
children, one of them an infant a few weeks old. The pardon is granted solely on their account,
and in the hope that the release of their father will relieve their destitute and forlorn condition.
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period, frequently more than 300 per year. More than three-quarters of the
grants issued before 1910 went to petitioners seeking to reduce or avoid a
prison term, 64 and post-sentence pardons “to restore civil rights” amounted
to less than 20% of all grants. 65 After 1910, most grants to prisoners were
styled “sentence commutation,” replacing the full or conditional pardon
more frequently used in earlier years to release a person from a prison term.
After 1930, post-sentence pardons “to restore civil rights” became the most
frequent form of relief, as parole displaced pardon as the primary
mechanism for early release. 66
Pardoning throughout this period was a regular part of the
housekeeping business of the presidency. Pardons were granted frequently
and generously at regular intervals over the course of each president’s term,
with no slow starts and no bunching of grants at the end. 67 Indeed, between
1902 and 1933 there was only one month in which not a single pardon was
granted, the month before Warren Harding’s fatal 1923 heart attack. 68
Sheer volume protected the president’s ability to make an occasional grant
for personal or political reasons that the public might otherwise not
understand, and the low-key routine of the pardon program was “of such a
character as not to attract wide attention.” 69 In addition to the generous

64
While most grants to prisoners prior to 1895 were simply styled “pardon,” after that
time official reports categorized grants in a variety of ways. For example, between 1895 and
1904, presidents granted 871 unconditional pardons, 101 conditional pardons, 552
commutations, 6 conditional commutations, 362 pardons “to restore civil rights,” and 89
miscellaneous grants of reprieve, respite, and remission of fine. See 1895-1904 ATT’Y GEN.
ANN. REP. (1895-1904). By the 1920s, the number of full pardons had declined to about
10% of the total, and most grants were described either as “commutation of sentence” or
“pardon to restore civil rights.” For the decade between 1920 and 1929, the presidents
issued 1764 commutations, 1239 pardons to restore civil rights, and only 203 full pardons.
See 1920-1929 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (1920-1929).
65
See HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 100-01. Between Reconstruction and 1895, there
were few pardons granted to people who were neither imprisoned nor threatened with prison,
simply “to restore civil rights.” After 1895, however, “the President disclosed consistently
and impressively an inclination toward this form of clemency.” Id. at 101.
66
The final simplification of the grant typology into two types of grants (commutation
for prisoners and pardon for those who had fully served their sentence) was not
accomplished until the 1962 clemency rules. However, after 1930 there were few pardons
granted to anyone who was still under sentence. The term “commutation” itself did not
appear in the clemency rules until 1962.
67
Graphs and tables showing pardon grant patterns from 1900 through 2001, based on
data from the Justice Department’s Office of the Pardon Attorney, can be found in P.S.
RUCKMAN, JR., supra note 4, at 15-27. The practice of regular monthly pardoning continued
under Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Truman, but became less regular beginning with
President Eisenhower. Id. at 23-24.
68
See Ruckman, supra note 17, at 16-18 figs.1-9.
69
HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 5.
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grant rate, it was the thoroughness and perceived fairness of the Justice
Department’s review that guaranteed public confidence in the process and
protected the president’s ability to exercise his discretion as he thought best.
Ensuring a central role in the pardon process to those officially responsible
for the underlying criminal case gave the president access to information
about the case, and in addition helped insulate the president from political
pressure and importuning.
This system had important benefits not just for the presidency, but for
the justice system itself. Until the 1950s, the president personally signed
hundreds of separate pardon warrants each year, and until the 1980s the
attorney general personally signed hundreds of separate letters of advice
describing each case and stating the reasons for clemency. 70 In this way,
both officials spent a considerable amount of time reviewing the endproduct of their justice system. Whatever the efficiencies of such a system,
probably unthinkable today, it maximized the chances that pardon would
advance the administration’s criminal justice agenda.
C. PARDON GIVES BIRTH TO PAROLE: 1910-1930

In 1910, a statutory parole system was introduced at the three thenexisting federal penitentiaries, 71 beginning the process whereby the pardon
power would be used less frequently to free prisoners and more commonly
to restore rights to those who had served their sentences and spent a period
of time in the free community. 72 Other sentencing alternatives introduced

70

President Eisenhower began the practice of signing a “master” warrant listing the
names of all pardon beneficiaries, and authorizing the Attorney General (later the Deputy
Attorney General, and still later the Pardon Attorney) to prepare and sign individual warrants
for delivery to the individual beneficiary. See Warrants of Pardon (on file in Office of the
Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice).
71
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819; see U.S. PAROLE COMM’N, HISTORY OF
THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 6-7 (2003), available at http://www.fedcure.org/
information/TheHistoryOfTheFederalParoleSystem-2003.pdf.
72
Pardon’s performance of a paroling function in the nineteenth century federal justice
system, and its gradual displacement by a statutory prison release procedure and sentencing
alternatives in the early twentieth century, was mirrored in most of the states. See U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 4 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES: PAROLE
52-53 (1939) [hereinafter 4 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES].
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around this time similarly reduced the demands on pardon, 73 though they
did not immediately depress the demand for clemency. 74
The familial relationship between pardon and parole was reflected in
the fact that the two forms of early release were initially administered
together. Between 1910 and 1930, the attorney general reviewed both
pardon applications and the recommendations of the three institutional
parole boards that the 1910 act created (one in each of the three federal
penitentiaries). In 1919 and again in 1920, Attorney General A. Mitchell
Palmer complained that the task of reviewing parole and pardon cases had
become so onerous that it was “practically impossible for him to give to
these cases the thought and attention they require,” and proposed
transferring jurisdiction over both pardon and parole cases to a three-person
board. 75 For that reason, he urged the creation of a separate federal agency
to handle all pardon and parole cases, and to manage the federal prison
system. In the late 1920s, parole cases were staffed through the pardon
attorney’s office, further evidence that the two forms of relief were
originally considered complementary if not interchangeable.76 Finally, in
1930 Congress created the U.S. Board of Parole and gave it authority to
approve all paroles, thus relieving the attorney general of responsibility for
administering the new system of indeterminate sentences, though he
remained personally responsible for clemency cases.77 Two years later, the
73

The growing number of appeals in non-capital cases reduced the number of prisoner
petitions seeking to correct error in the district court, while the authorization of probation in
1923 gave a sentencing alternative to judges not inclined to impose a prison term. In 1926,
the attorney general reported that the availability of probation had eliminated “a large
number of [clemency] applications involving offenses of a trivial nature.” 1926 ATT’Y GEN.
ANN. REP. 117 (1926).
74
Between the start of 1900 and the end of 1909, presidents approved 1,518 grants of
clemency; between the start of 1910 and the end of 1919 (the first decade of the statute’s
operation), they approved 2,534 grants; and between the start of 1920 and the end of 1929,
they approved 3,588 grants. HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 97-99 (Table I: Applications for
Clemency and the Disposition Made of Them). Federal liquor prohibition accounted for
much of the increase. In 1930, the pardon attorney estimated that 70% of his budget was
devoted to processing prohibition cases. Id. at 92 n.18.
75
1919 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 4 (1919). The report further states:
It appears desirable that a board be created for the purpose of passing upon and recommending
action to the President in pardon cases and for the purpose of finally approving paroles granted
by the parole boards established at institutions where Federal prisoners are confined. It is
recommended that a board of three men be constituted and fully empowered to handle this work.
The jurisdiction over Federal penal institutions should also be vested in this board.

See also 1920 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 6-7 (1920). The language used in the 1920 report is
identical to that of the 1919 report.
76
See 1928 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 78 (1928); 1929 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 79 (1929).
77
See U.S. PAROLE COMM’N, supra note 71, at 7. The same year, Congress also created
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, whose first director was Sanford Bates. See Paul W. Keve, At
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attorney general described how the number of parole releases had
burgeoned. 78 By the end of the 1930s, parole had largely supplanted
clemency as a means of releasing prisoners. While there were still several
dozen commutations granted each year, many were simply to the minimum
term so that the recipient might be eligible for parole.79
In the beginning, parole was not seen as theoretically distinct from
pardon, but rather simply a more efficient way of administering the old
Before long, however, different theoretical justifications
system. 80
developed for the two forms of early release: pardon was seen as an end to
punishment as a gesture of mercy, while parole was considered a
continuation of punishment in the community and intended to rehabilitate.81
To most students of criminal justice, the substitution of parole for pardon
appeared to be progress. Yet the origins of the former in the latter led to
some doctrinal and operational confusion, perpetuated by the joint
administration of the two authorities in most of the states. 82 In 1939, the

the Mercy of the States, in ESCAPING PRISON MYTHS 25, 33 (John W. Roberts ed., 1994).
Bates and the Bureau’s second director, James V. Bennett, managed the difficult transition to
a centralized federal prison system. Id. at 33-35. See generally JAMES V. BENNETT, I CHOSE
PRISON (1970).
78
1932 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 127 (1932).
Since 1910 when the Federal parole act became effective, the number of prisoners released
annually on parole from the Federal institutions has grown from 133 in 1910-11 to 5,207 in
1931-32. The increase has been especially rapid during the past few years. Parole release
numbered 1,069 in 1928-29, 2,536 in 1929-30, and 4,566 in 1930-31. Thus the number paroled
in 1931-32 was more than five times as large as the number paroled three years previously, and
more than twice as large as the number paroled two years previously. The number of parole
releases has also increased more rapidly than the prison population . . . . Parole releases in 191011 numbered only 6.4 per 100 of the prison population . . . while parole releases in 1931-32
numbered 38 per 100 of the prison population . . . .

Id. The numbers reported in this passage do not include federal prisoners paroled from state
institutions. The 1910 statute empowered state boards to release federal prisoners housed in
state institutions on the same terms as other inmates of these facilities (although it also
empowered the Attorney General to veto the paroles approved by state boards). Cf. id.
79
See OPA CLEMENCY STATISTICS, 1900-1945, supra note 4.
80
Parole apparently was originally introduced in some states not for any new interest in
encouraging rehabilitation, but for a similar desire to relieve administrative burdens. See,
e.g., Sheldon L. Messinger et al., The Foundations of Parole in California, 19 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 69, 69 (1985) (“Parole was introduced in California, and used for over a decade,
primarily to relieve governors of part of the burden of exercising clemency to reduce the
excessive sentences of selected state prisoners.”).
81
See 4 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 72, at 2-3.
82
Even as late as 1939, in eighteen states, pardons and paroles were granted by the
governor or by a clemency board that sometimes included the governor. (In six of these
states the courts had held parole to be in derogation of the governor’s constitutional pardon
power.) 4 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 72, at 44-54. In another nine states
the governor was advised in pardon matters by the parole board. See id. The shared
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Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures observed that “[m]uch of
the present trouble with the administration of parole arises from the fact that
parole is granted as though it were a pardon.” 83 Indeed, to the extent that
substantial rehabilitation was and still is considered a basis for clemency, it
may be that there has always been a much closer kinship between the two
forms of relief than the theoreticians have been willing to admit. 84 All the
same, the authors of the 1939 Survey were confident that the availability of
parole would limit pardon’s role in the justice system: “Are not judicial
review and modern release procedures like parole sufficient to do all that
pardon ever did—and do it better? To a large extent the answer must be
yes.” 85 After the federal experiment with parole was abandoned in 1984,
and a system of determinate sentences reinstated, some scholars anticipated
that pardon would once again claim a useful role, 86 though to date this has
not happened.
D. PARDON IN THE AGE OF INDETERMINACY, 1930-1980

The 1898 McKinley rules 87 contemplated that pardon would be the
relief sought by individuals faced with or already serving a prison sentence,
and mentioned almost as an afterthought pardon “merely” to restore civil
rights. But after 1931, the existence of an independent paroling authority
and indeterminate sentencing limited the role of clemency as a prison
release mechanism, and post-sentence pardons became by far the most
frequent form of clemency. Franklin Roosevelt granted more than 3,000
post-sentence pardons during his thirteen years in office, but only 488
commutations; Truman granted more than 1,900 pardons (including 141 “to

administrative framework has continued to the present in two-thirds of the states (although
Oklahoma is the only state where the governor still must approve all paroles). See LOVE,
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 23-36.
83
4 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 72, at 53.
84
Standards for clemency and parole frequently the same, and parole has been held to
have similar discretionary attributes. Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464
(1981) (“A commutation decision . . . shares some of the characteristics of a decision
whether to grant parole.”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 293 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “parole is simply an act of executive grace”). However, despite the
necessarily subjective and predictive nature of the parole-release decision, state statutes may
create liberty interests in parole release that are entitled to protection under the Due Process
Clause. See Greeholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1 (1979).
85
See 3 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 59, at 296.
86
See MOORE, supra note 16, at 86 (speculating that the abolition of federal parole could
lead to “an expanded and crucial role for pardons”).
87
See McKinley Rules, supra note 45.
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avert deportation”) 88 but only 118 commutations; Eisenhower granted 1,100
pardons and 47 commutations. Later presidents also commuted few
sentences. 89
The administration of the pardon power also changed, becoming less
transparent after the attorney general stopped publishing the reasons for his
pardon recommendations in 1932. 90 For the next twenty-five years,
published reports of the pardon attorney contained only bare case statistics,
and between 1941 and 1955 no reports were published at all. 91
In 1958 a new pardon attorney produced a detailed report confirming a
simplified classification scheme for clemency grants: commutation was an
“extraordinary” remedy for prisoners seeking reduction of sentence, while
pardon was reserved for those who had served their sentence and were
seeking “forgiveness for the purpose of restoring their good names,
removing the stigma of conviction, or securing the restoration of such rights
as may have been lost by virtue of the convictions.” 92 Also, during the
1950s a number of federal employees sought pardon to avoid losing their

88

See typescript Reports of the Pardon Attorney’s Office, 1946-1952 (available from the
Office of the Pardon Attorney and on file with author). Between 1962 and 1993, the
clemency rules specifically provided for a waiver of the eligibility waiting period “in cases
of aliens seeking a pardon to avert deportation.” See 28 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1963); 28 C.F.R. § 1.2
(1985).
89
One notable exception was a rare systematic use of the pardon power in the 1960s,
when Presidents Kennedy and Johnson commuted the sentences of more than 300 drug
offenders serving mandatory minimum sentences under the Narcotics Control Act of 1956.
See 1963 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 62-63 (1963); 1964 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 64 (1964); see
also Shanor & Miller, supra note 17, at 142.
90
See supra note 43.
91
Typescript reports of the pardon attorney from 1941 through 1955 are available from
the Office of the Pardon Attorney, and are on file with the author.
92
See 1958 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. (1958) 43-44. Only about fifteen commutation
applications were filed each year from 1953 through 1958, usually seeking release because
of critical illness, or “some extraordinary reasons why the President should be called upon to
act rather than wait for statutory provisions to take care of the situation.” Id. at 43. As to
pardon,
[t]he majority of applicants for pardon give various reasons for seeking clemency. Some
examples are: The substantial businessman who seeks a pardon of the offense committed more
than 25 years ago in order to remove the stigma from the names of his grandchildren; the young
man who robbed a bank during his teenage years, learned a dental technician trade while in
prison, studied dentistry upon release, and needed a pardon to secure a professional dentist’s
license; the real estate broker who moved from one state on account of his wife’s health and
found that he needed a pardon in order to receive a broker’s license in the new state; the young
man who felt he needed a pardon to help him secure employment; and elderly men and women
who seek to clear their names before they die.

Id. at 45.
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pensions under the Smith Act. 93 The pardon attorney reported that more
than 400 petitions for pardon had been filed each year between 1954 and
1958, adding that “150 old cases [were] reactivated each year.” 94 Only
about 25% of all petitions were sent forward to the president with the
attorney general’s favorable recommendation, though it appears that all of
these were granted. 95
Clemency practice changed again during the Kennedy Administration,
when revised clemency rules directed the attorney general to send a report
and recommendation to the White House in every case filed with the
Department of Justice.96 This resulted in a lot more work for the pardon
attorney’s small staff and a higher grant rate for post-sentence pardons over
the next twenty years: the percentage of pardon petitions acted on favorably
by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter varied between
30% and 40%, a significantly higher grant rate than under earlier presidents,
when substantial numbers of petitions were being denied administratively
by the Justice Department without ever being sent to the president. While
grants to prisoners were less frequent because of the availability of parole,
an average of 150 post-sentence pardons were issued each year between
1960 and 1980. 97 Still, pardoning remained a routine and relatively lowkey activity of the presidency that took place largely unnoticed. Perhaps
more than anything else, it was the regularity and accessibility of the
administrative process that maintained a level of public confidence in

93
Id. (“An increasing number of Government employees, with records of past
convictions, apply for pardons necessitated by Public Law 769, 83rd Congress. This Act
denies retirement annuity benefits to employees convicted of certain crimes unless pardons
are granted.”).
94
Id. at 44.
95
Id.
96
See 28 C.F.R. Part 1 (1963); 27 Fed. Reg. 11002 (Oct. 30, 1962). These regulations
also formalized the simplified grant typology announced in the 1958 report of the pardon
attorney.
97
See OPA CLEMENCY STATISTICS, 1945-PRESENT, supra note 1. It is hard to be precise
about the grant rate for post-sentence pardons before President Nixon’s first term, because
the pardon attorney statistical reports do not break out petitions received and denied by type
of relief until 1967. That said, Franklin Roosevelt granted 27.8% of all clemency petitions
acted upon during his tenure, Truman granted 41.5%, Eisenhower granted 26.7%, and
Kennedy granted 40.9%. (In light of the fact that Eisenhower commuted only forty-seven
sentences in eight years, it is likely that his 1110 pardons represent more than 30% of the
total number of pardon petitions acted on during his two terms.) Nixon granted 51% of the
pardon petitions acted on during his tenure, and 26.3% of pardon and commutation petitions
combined; Ford granted 39% of pardon petitions and 31.2% overall; and Carter granted 34%
of pardon petitions and 21.6% overall. Id.
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pardoning, which in turn protected the president from being suspected of
abusing his power. 98 That was all about to change.
III. PUBLIC MERCY IN THE CRIME WAR: 1980 TO THE PRESENT
A. PARDON’S PERFECT STORM

After 1980, presidential pardoning went into a decline. In part this
was because the retributivist theory of “just deserts” and the politics of the
“war on crime” together made pardon seem at the same time useless and
dangerous. For retributivists, the “essentially lawless” exercise of mercy
seemed a “threat to society dedicated to the rule of law.” 99 The architects of
the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act stripped all discretionary relief
mechanisms out of the law, even the modest set-aside remedy of the Youth
Corrections Act. 100 There was no place for pardon in such a system.
Contemporaneous with the ascendency of retributivism in punishment
theory, crime control became a central issue in American politics. 101 It
became conventional wisdom that appearing “soft on crime” could only get
an elected official into trouble, and the Willie Horton episode during the
98
It is no accident that the president tended to get in trouble with pardons only when he
failed to utilize the Justice Department’s pardon process. See Walter Trohan, Bridges Seeks
to End Secrecy in U.S. Pardons, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Aug. 30, 1953, at 10 (President Truman
accused of cronyism in pardoning seven current or former government officials on his way
out of office, without Justice Department advice).
99
AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO STOP AN EXECUTION 69 (2005).
The retributivist philosophers whose ideas eventually triumphed in the 1984 Sentencing
Reform Act took a dim view of unruly pardon, considering it an unprincipled and
unwelcome intrusion in the law’s enlightened process. See MOORE, supra note 16, at 28-34,
84. Utilitarian theory also had no use for pardon, believing that “clemency is a virtue which
ought to shine in the code, and not in private judgment.” Id. at 39 (citing C.B. BECCARIA, AN
ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 158-59 (1953)). Moore herself espouses a retributivist
view of pardon as “an act of justice rather than an act of mercy.” Id. at 129; see also id. at
213 (arguing that “a justified pardon is one that corrects injustice rather than tempers justice
with mercy”). Moore’s retributivist theory of pardon is compared with Jeffrie Murphy’s
theory of “public mercy” in Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar
Buttons: Reflections on the President’s Duty to be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483,
1500-09 (2000).
100
Perhaps inadvertently, in ridding the legal system of discretionary relief provisions
like parole, Congress left a key residual role for clemency as “fail safe.” Herrera v. Collins,
506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (quoting MOORE, supra note 16, at 131).
101
James Vorenberg, Executive Director of President Johnson’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, commented on the growing threat of crime in
a 1972 piece in The Atlantic, opining that “during the past five years the frustration of poor
people and minorities with continued denial of opportunities to improve their lives by lawful
means has made reliance on crime an increasingly acceptable alternative.” James
Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years, THE ATLANTIC, May 1972, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/politics/crime/ crimewar.htm.
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1988 presidential campaign confirmed that pardoning could ruin a political
career. 102 As pardoning became less frequent, the inherent mystery of the
pardon process reinforced in the public’s mind the popular myth that pardon
is available only to those with money and connections, a way for a
president to reward intimates at the end of his term. This would become a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
But perhaps the most important negative influence on presidential
pardoning was the hostility of federal prosecutors and a change in the
administration of the pardon program at the Justice Department that
allowed prosecutors to control clemency recommendations. Historically,
the attorney general’s clemency recommendations had reflected his dual
role as political counselor and chief law enforcement officer. Attorney
General Griffin Bell’s decision in the late 1970s to delegate responsibility
for making clemency recommendations to officials responsible for
prosecution policy eliminated this institutional ambivalence, transforming
the general tenor of the advice the president would receive from the Justice
Department from the 1980s onwards. 103 No longer did the Justice
Department feel its old obligation “to accord to the convict all that he may
be fairly entitled to have said in his favor.” 104 Instead, it treated every
clemency petition as a potential challenge to the law enforcement policies
underlying the conviction.105 Once pardon policy became part and parcel of

102

See generally DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA (1995).
Another danger was that a particular grant might be distorted and give a mistaken impression
of the Administration’s commitment to crime control. For example, after President Bush
pardoned a particularly deserving and well-known individual who had been convicted of a
minor marijuana possession offense thirty years before, the grant was characterized as
“especially ironic, given the administration’s current push to enact tougher penalties on drug
offenders . . . .” Tom Watson, In Rare Move, Bush Pardons Drug Offender; Civic Service,
Campaign Win Forgiveness for Harlem Globetrotter, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at 1; see
also Pardon Me, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 7, 1996, at 3 (quoting Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa.: “I don’t
know how you can champion yourself in the debate on drug use when you pardon drug
dealers.”).
103
See Love, supra note 17, at 7-8.
104
See supra note 36.
105
In the Reagan Administration, the pardon attorney described his office’s more
“exacting” scrutiny of pardon applications “to better reflect the administration’s philosophy
toward crime.” Pete Earley, Presidents Set Own Rules on Granting Clemency, WASH. POST,
Mar. 19, 1984, at A17; see also Larry Margasak, Any Pardons Would Come After Election
Day, Observers Say, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 18, 1988 (“[T]he administration’s use of career
prosecutors to screen pardon requests has resulted in a natural inclination for tighter
scrutiny.”). All but a handful of the individuals officially responsible for approving Justice
Department clemency recommendations since 1983 have been former federal prosecutors.
See Margaret Colgate Love, Fear of Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the Practice of
Pardoning, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 125, 126 n.23 (2001). As a practical matter, Justice
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a tough-on-crime agenda, pardon practice served primarily to ratify the
results achieved by prosecutors, not to provide any real possibility of
revising them. With very little independent interest at the White House in
the routine work of pardoning, it was inevitable that the number and
frequency of clemency grants would steadily decline through the 1980s.
B. THE CLINTON MELTDOWN

At the beginning of the Clinton Administration, the effects of
mandatory sentencing and the abolition of parole swelled commutation
filings. 106 Yet President Clinton was disinclined to pardon: apart from the
risk of making a mistake, he did not want to be outflanked by Republicans
on criminal justice issues.107 Breaking from past practice, he issued no
clemency grants at all in four of the first five years of his presidency and
allowed the Justice Department’s clemency recommendations to pile up at
the White House without action.108 During his second term, a number of
high profile clemency cases were handled entirely by the White House
Counsel, an unprecedented public distancing from the Justice Department’s
pardon program. 109 As a result, President Clinton entered his final year in
Department pardon policy and practice has been controlled since 1997 by David Margolis, a
career prosecutor on the staff of the Deputy Attorney General.
106
To manage the caseload, the Pardon Attorney was directed by the Office of the
Deputy Attorney General to prepare summary reports recommending denial of clemency in
all cases except those in which a Member of Congress or the White House had expressed an
interest. See Memorandum from Roger Adams to Margaret Love (Oct. 23, 1993) (on file
with author). While this directive was later retracted, its spirit continued to inform the
Justice Department’s administration of the pardon power. Of the sixty-one commutations
granted by President Clinton during his eight years in office, no more than a handful were
favorably recommended by the Justice Department. Several of these were requested by
prosecutors to fix their mistake. See, e.g., Exec. Grant of Clemency to Johnny Palacios,
Aug. 21, 1995 (on file with Office of the Pardon Attorney) (cooperator for whom prosecutor
had neglected to timely file a sentence reduction motion); Exec. Grant of Clemency to Alain
Orozco, July 5, 2001, discussed in David M. Zlotnick, Federal Prosecutors and the
Clemency Power, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 168, 169 (2001).
107
See, e.g., Marc Mauer, The Fragility of Criminal Justice Reform, 21 SOC. JUST. 14, 21
(1994) (describing Clinton’s effort to “‘take the crime issue away’ from Republicans”); Tony
G. Poveda, Clinton, Crime and the Justice Department, 21 SOC. JUST. 73, 75 (1994) (“[I]n
the Clinton era . . . ideas that are outside the scope of the current ideological hegemony of
‘get tough’ crime policies will be selectively ignored or silenced.”).
108
See OPA CLEMENCY STATISTICS, 1945-PRESENT, supra note 1; see also Margaret
Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons from Clinton’s Last Pardons, 31 CAP. U. L.
REV. 185, 196 n.38 (2003) [hereinafter Love, Paradox] (describing irregular consideration of
pardons at the White House throughout the Clinton presidency).
109
See THE PARDON ATTORNEY REFORM AND INTEGRITY ACT, S. REP. NO. 106-231, at 8
(2000) (commutation of sixteen Puerto Rican terrorists without Justice Department advice);
see also Darryl W. Jackson et al., Bending Toward Justice: The Posthumous Pardon of
Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, 74 IND. L.J. 1251 (1999) (describing Pardon Attorney’s
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office having pardoned less generously than any president since John
Adams. 110 By that time, discouraged by the President’s apparent lack of
interest, the Justice Department had effectively stopped producing pardon
recommendations.
As the time on his watch grew short, in the fall of 2000 another side of
President Clinton emerged. He took every opportunity to talk to the press
about pardons, lamenting how few he had granted, and signaling an
intention to do more before leaving office.111 For the first time in eight
years, he expressed sympathy with nonviolent drug offenders serving long
prison terms, 112 and articulated a generous policy of restoring civil rights to
anyone who had completed his sentence. 113 At the eleventh hour, President
Clinton recognized how meager his overall pardoning record was compared
to that of his predecessors, notably President Reagan, and resolved to make
up for lost time. But by that time, despite repeated urging by White House
staffers, the Justice Department was either unwilling or unable to meet the
President’s desire for more pardon recommendations. In October of 2000,

refusal to docket posthumous pardon application on behalf of first black West Point
graduate).
110
See Love, Paradox, supra note 108, at 196 (citing P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Federal
Executive Clemency in the United States, 1789-1995: A Preliminary Report (Nov. 1995)
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Tampa,
Florida, on file with author)).
111
See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Ceremony Appointing Roger
Gregory to an Interim Seat on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (Dec. 27, 2000), reprinted
in 13 FED. SENT. REP. 228 (2000) [hereinafter Gregory Remarks] (“I wish I could do some
more [pardons]—I’m going to try. I’m trying to get it out of the system that exists, that
existed before I got here, and I’m doing the best I can.”). Newsweek reported an incident in
early January in which the President wandered into the press section of Air Force One on a
trip to Arkansas and asked “You got anybody you want to pardon?” Weston Kosova,
Backstage at the Finale, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 2001, at 30.
112
Jan Wenner, Bill Clinton: The Rolling Stone Interview, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 28,
2000, at 98 (“We really need a reexamination of our entire policy on imprisonment. . . . [A]
lot of people are in prison today because they have drug problems or alcohol problems. . . . I
think the sentences in many cases are too long for nonviolent offenders. . . . I think
[mandatory minimum sentences] should be reexamined.”).
113
Gregory Remarks, supra note 111, at 228:
I have always thought that Presidents and governors . . . should be quite conservative on
commutations—that is, there needs to be a very specific reason if you reduce someone’s
sentence or let them out—but more broad-minded about pardons because, in so many states in
America, pardons are necessary to restore people’s rights of citizenship. Particularly if they
committed relatively minor offenses, or if some years have elapsed and they’ve been good
citizens and there’s no reason to believe they won’t be good citizens in the future, I think we
ought to give them a chance, having paid the price, to be restored to full citizenship.
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Pardon Attorney Roger Adams was directed to advise pardon-seekers to
press their suits directly with the White House. 114
With the clemency review process in the Justice Department
effectively sidelined by its own choice, the President set up an ad hoc
procedure in the White House Counsel’s office to identify suitable
candidates for pardon and commutation. He did not have to go far to find
candidates after his intentions became public. Throughout the fall of 2000,
pardon-seekers besieged the President and his staff for a final favor, so that
pardon matters occupied the attention of even the most senior White House
staff. 115 Rumors flew about deals and promises involving pardons,
influential insiders were retained to argue otherwise hopeless cases, and the
press speculated about who was and who was not likely to be a beneficiary
of Clinton’s end-of-term largesse. 116 By their own account, during the final
weeks White House staff at all levels worked around the clock compiling
and revising lists of pardon applicants, fielding calls from influential

114

The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich: Hearings Before the
H. Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong. 1st Sess. 342-43 (2001) [hereinafter House
Hearings] (testimony of Beth Nolan, Counsel to former President Clinton, describing
unresponsive Justice Department pardon process at the conclusion of the Clinton
Administration, and the ensuing frantic effort at the White House in the final weeks to
process the hundreds of clemency requests coming directly to the White House); see also
Love, Paradox, supra note 108, at 191-97 (describing run-up to final Clinton pardons, the
failure of the Justice Department pardon process, staffing of pardons in the White House,
and the grants themselves).
115
House Hearings, supra note 114, at 342-43. Ms. Nolan reported that in the final
weeks the White House was “inundated” with pardon requests, and importuned by
influential people, including members of Congress, about particular cases:
They were coming from everywhere . . . . We had requests from members of Congress on both
sides of the aisle and both Houses. We had requests from movie stars, newscasters, former
Presidents, former first ladies. There wasn’t anybody—I refused to go to holiday parties because
I couldn’t stand being—nobody wanted to know how I was, thank you very much. They wanted
to know about a pardon. So I just didn’t go.

Id. A chart distributed by the Department of Justice to members of the press on February 13,
2001, reveals that upwards of thirty of the recipients of pardon or commutation on January
20 filed applications with the Justice Department in the final weeks (or even days) days of
President Clinton’s term, leaving no time for them to be considered in the ordinary course.
A like number did not file applications with the Department at all. The chart, which was
never published and is untitled, is on file with author.
116
See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald & Michael Moss, Rising Number Sought Pardons in Last 2
Years, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at A1; Peter Slevin & George Lardner, Jr., Rush of Pardons
Unusual in Scope, Lack of Scrutiny; Back-Door Lobbying Had Large Role in Clinton’s
Decisions, Observers Say, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2001, at A3; Don Van Natta Jr. & Marc
Lacey, Access Proved Vital in the Race to Secure a Pardon from Clinton, N.Y TIMES, Feb.
25, 2001, at A1. The atmosphere at the White House in the final weeks was likened by
former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh to a “Middle Eastern bazaar.” Love, Paradox,
supra note 108, at 199 n.44.
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supporters, and attending meetings at which the merits of pardon cases were
debated, for the most part without input from the Justice Department. 117 All
of the ordinarily applicable standards and procedures went by the boards in
the frenzy of back-door lobbying by Clinton friends and family. 118 In his
drive to create an entire legacy overnight, the President gave pardoning a
place on his agenda alongside the Middle East peace negotiations and the
independent counsel’s inquiry into his own conduct. Relieved of the
constraints imposed by the Justice Department’s administration of the
power, he enjoyed a final unencumbered opportunity to reward friends,
bless strangers, and settle old scores.
As President Clinton’s final day in office approached, many in
Washington were braced for some last minute surprises. But no one was
quite prepared for the 177 grants announced on the morning of January 20
just before the new president was to take the oath of office, which were
unprecedented in number and in kind. The Pardon Attorney, who had been
up all night as the White House continued to add names to (or subtract them
from) the list of beneficiaries, told a reporter that he didn’t even know who
many of the people were or how to reach them to inform them of their good
fortune. 119 Some of the grants were immediately identifiable as personal
gestures to friends and family, 120 and some were evidently aimed at nailing

117

See House Hearings, supra note 114. In the summer of 2002, the House Committee
on Government Reform published a three-volume report on its investigation into the final
Clinton pardons, which focuses on a dozen or so of the most controversial cases. See
generally JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE, H.R. REP.
NO. 107-454 (2002) [hereinafter JUSTICE UNDONE]. See also id. at 1309-20 (describing
White House staff handling of the Carlos Vignali petition); id. at 1195-1231, 1468-71, 16861707 (charts prepared by White House staff noting support for particular clemency
applicants).
118
For a colorful account by a member of the loyal opposition, including a representative
sampling of the extensive contemporary press coverage, see BARBARA OLSON, THE FINAL
DAYS 113-93 (2001). For further discussion of the final grants, see Love, supra note 114, at
188-93 (2003).
119
See Goldstein & Schmidt, supra note 17, at A1. Mr. Adams reported that some
requests from the White House arrived so late in the evening on Friday that his office did not
have time to conduct record checks with the FBI. Among the names his office received for
the first time on the night of January 19 were the President’s brother, Roger Clinton, and
Richard Riley Jr., the son of Clinton’s Secretary of Education. Id. Three weeks later, Mr.
Adams again described the harrowing final hours in testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. See Recent Presidential Pardons: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Roger C. Adams, Pardon Attorney).
120
The President pardoned his brother Roger Clinton’s 1985 cocaine trafficking
conviction, but did not pardon any of the individuals Roger Clinton had reportedly
recommended. See JUSTICE UNDONE, supra note 117, at 709-831; see also infra note 124,
for description of grants to long-time friends Fife Symington and Paul Prosperi.
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shut the coffin of the Independent Counsel Act. 121 The pardons granted to
fugitive billionaire Marc Rich and his partner Pincus Greene produced
instant outrage from all quarters, focused on the key role of former White
House Counsel Jack Quinn and his manipulation of the Justice Department
advisory process. 122
But as the press parsed through the many less familiar names in the
weeks that followed, it became apparent that numerous other grants had
been secured outside official channels through the intervention of
individuals with direct access to the President, and that at least some of
these individuals had been paid handsomely for their efforts. 123 Some of
121
The morning after the pardons were issued, the Washington Post noted: “Clinton
appeared to be tying up loose ends from many of the independent counsel investigations that
had daunted him and several senior members of his administration virtually from the
beginning of his tenure.” Goldstein & Schmidt, supra note 17, at A1; see also Stephen
Braun & Richard Serrano, Clinton Pardons: Ego Fed a Numbers Game, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2001, at A1. The President pardoned four individuals convicted as a result of the
Whitewater Independent Counsel investigation (Susan McDougal, Christopher V. Wade,
Stephen A. Smith, Robert W. Palmer), his former Housing Secretary Henry Cisneros, and
Linda Medlar Jones. Goldstein & Schmidt, supra note 17, at A1. He also “wiped the slate
clean” on the Independent Counsel’s investigation of former agriculture secretary Mike
Espy, commuting the sentence of Espy’s former chief of staff Ron Blackley and pardoning
Richard Douglas, Alvarez T. Ferouillet, John J. Hemmingson, and James Lake (Archibald
R. Schaffer III had been pardoned on December 22, 2000, shortly before his sentencing). Id.
The President reportedly struggled over whether to pardon his former close political
associates Webb Hubbell and Jim Guy Tucker, both convicted as a result of the Whitewater
investigation, but in the end did not. See OLSON, supra note 118, at 160; Would You Pardon
Them?, TIME, Feb. 18, 2001, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,99871-2,00.html.
122
See, e.g., JUSTICE UNDONE, supra note 117, at 99-266.
123
Commutation grants were made to Harvey Weinig, a New York lawyer convicted of
money laundering for a major drug organization, who had been privy to a murder-for-hire
scheme and whose commutation was vigorously opposed by the U.S. Attorney and the
Justice Department, see Benjamin Weiser, A Felon’s Well-Connected Path to Clemency,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2001, at A1; four Hasidic Jews convicted of embezzling federal grant
money intended to benefit their own small community, see Randal C. Archibold, Behind
Four Pardons, a Sect Eager for Political Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001 at B1; Dorothy
Rivers and Mel Reynolds, both serving prison terms for fraud and both reportedly
recommended for release by the Reverend Jesse Jackson, see OLSON, supra note 118, at 15658; Deborah A. Devaney, A Voice for Victims: What Prosecutors Can Add to the Clemency
Process, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 163, 165-66 (2001). Pardon grants went to a number of wellconnected Arkansas businessmen and lawyers who never filed an application with the Justice
Department. See OLSON, supra note 118, at 156-67. One case that proved embarrassing to
the President was that of A. Glen Braswell, whose 1983 conviction for mail fraud and
perjury was pardoned even though he was then the subject of an FBI investigation for tax
evasion and money laundering. See Christopher Marquis & Michael Moss, A Clinton InLaw Received $400,000 in 2 Pardon Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1. It was
reported in the press that he had paid Hugh Rodham $200,000 to press his case at the White
House. See id. In January 2003, Braswell was arrested and charged with tax evasion. See
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the grants involved uses of the pardon power that had not been seen in over
a century. 124
The verdict of history on President Clinton’s pardoning is likely to be
that he abused the power, by failing to use it at all for most of his time in
office, and by using it excessively in the final days to benefit his family and
friends. But the experience of Clinton’s final months in office teaches
another more general lesson: at some point during his term, the process for
administering the president’s power had come to serve the interests of
Justice Department prosecutors, rather than those of the presidency. The
extraordinary spate of irregular grants on Clinton’s last day in office was as
much the result of the Justice Department’s neglect of its institutional
responsibilities as it was of the President’s disregard of his. By
discouraging the President from pardoning responsibly earlier in his term,
by refusing to respond to his interest in pardoning when it belatedly
manifested itself, and by failing to object more forcefully to the more
abusive final grants, the Justice Department abandoned both the President
and its own obligation of stewardship.
C. GEORGE W. BUSH TAKES A PASS

At the beginning of his tenure, President George W. Bush vowed to
follow the advice of the Department of Justice in pardon matters, but he did
nothing to rejuvenate its pardon program. Eight years later, bearing out the
adage about those who do not study the past, well-connected clemencyCalif. Businessman Pardoned by Clinton Arrested for Tax Evasion, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 14,
2003.
124
Clinton pardoned his friend J. Fife Symington, III, former Governor of Arizona, who
was at the time awaiting retrial on charges of mail fraud, and John Deutsch, former Director
of Central Intelligence, who had pled guilty only the day before of misusing classified
information. See Bill Miller & Walter Pincus, Deutsch Had Signed Plea Agreement, Sources
Say, WASH. POST, JAN. 24, 2001, at A13. Howard Mechanic, a fugitive from justice for three
decades faced with a return to prison, was granted a full pardon rather than the commutation
he had sought. See Dennis Wagner & Brent Whiting, Mechanic Receives Pardon, Action
Springs Him from Jail, ARIZ. REPUB., Jan. 21, 2001, at A23. In what may have been the
most unusual use of the power, the President preemptively commuted the sentence of his
college classmate Paul Prosperi, a Florida lawyer who awaiting resentencing after a
conviction of counterfeiting securities and tax evasion. The warrant manifesting the Prosperi
grant stated: “I further hereby commute any total period of confinement that has already
been imposed or could be imposed . . . that is in excess of 36 months, and I further commute
any such period of confinement to be served in home confinement.” Exec. Grant of
Clemency to Paul Prosperi (Jan. 20, 2001) (on file with Office of the Pardon Attorney); see
Leon Fooksman, Embezzler Gets House Arrest: Ex-Lawyer Stole $1.8 Million from Irish
Client, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, March 3, 2001, at B1. Many of the pardon
grantees, including those whose convictions been obtained by an independent counsel, did
not satisfy the five-year eligibility waiting period in Justice Department regulations, and
some had not even applied for clemency.

2010]

THE TWILIGHT OF THE PARDON POWER

1201

seekers again bypassed the Justice Department and took their cases directly
to the White House. This time, as we will see, the anticipated flood of
irregular grants did not materialize, reportedly because the President
himself was “disgusted” by irregularity and unfairness in the pardon
process. 125
Throughout his time in office, President Bush appeared entirely
indifferent to pardoning, with two very conspicuous exceptions: former
White House aide Scooter Libby, whose sentence he commuted in June
2007, 126 and two Border Patrol agents convicted of shooting a fleeing drug
dealer, whose sentences he commuted the day he left office.127 For the
most part, Bush allowed his pardoning to be dictated by the Justice
Department, which sustained him on a bland diet of inconsequential postsentence pardons, seasoned with an occasional drug commutation.128 Such
a dull and essentially meaningless pardoning record might have been a
welcome respite from the drama of Clinton’s scandalous final grants, had it
not been for the fact that so few were granted while so many were denied:
Bush issued 200 clemency grants in eight years, and denied more than
10,000 petitions. 129 It is hard to tell what distinguishes the handful of lucky
125

See infra note 133.
See Statement on Granting Executive Clemency to I. Lewis Libby, 43 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 901 (July 2, 2007).
127
See Dan Eggen & Carrie Johnson, Bush Commutes Sentences of Ex-Agents, WASH.
POST, Jan. 20, 2009, at A2; Josh Meyer, Bush Commutes Terms of Convicted Border Agents,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2009, at A1.
128
Bush’s final grant tally was 189 pardons, most of them to individuals with convictions
more than twenty years old who had served no prison time, and 11 commutations. Five of
the commutations went to drug offenders evidently recommended by Justice, three of whom
were near the end of a long mandatory sentence. Of the other six commutations, two may
have been granted over a denial recommendation from Justice (Forte, Harris), and the other
four were granted without Justice Department recommendations (Libby, Prior, Ramos and
Compean). On the Forte grant, see Sara Netter, From Grammys to Prison to Freedom,
ABCNEWS.COM,
Nov.
26,
2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Music/
story?id=6333613&page=1. On Prior, see Rox Laird, One Lawyer, Then Notable Iowans,
Then Bush Saw Sentence as Unjust, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 30P; Grant Schulte,
Pardoned by Bush, Iowan Returns to Freedom, DES MOINES REG. Oct. 16, 2009, at 1. On
Ramos and Compean, see supra note 124 (press accounts). One additional pardon was
granted to Isaac Toussie without a recommendation from the Justice Department, but it is not
counted among the official grants because President Bush later declared that it had been
revoked. See Charlie Savage, On Clemency Fast Track, via Oval Office, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2009, A1.
129
See Love, Final Report Card on Pardoning by George W. Bush, supra note 2. In the
fall of 2006, Bush’s White House Counsel Harriet Miers reportedly urged the Justice
Department to produce more favorable grants, much as Beth Nolan had done toward the end
of the Clinton administration. Her request had no discernible effect on the production of
favorable recommendations. Ms. Miers was replaced shortly thereafter by Fred Fielding as
Counsel to the President, who evidently took no interest in pardons until the final months of
126
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winners from the thousands of disappointed suitors, and the record
establishes that the Justice Department pardon program under George W.
Bush operated like a lottery.
Questions about the fairness of the pardon process took on a new
urgency toward the end of Bush’s tenure, with press reports about case
backlogs at Justice and high-profile pardon-seekers jumping the line. 130 By
the fall of 2008, apparently frustrated by the unresponsiveness of the Justice
Department pardon bureaucracy, the White House again began accepting
clemency petitions directly from people with personal and political
connections to administration officials, evidently unconcerned about the
problems this had caused for President Clinton. 131 The massive pardoning
at the end of Bill Clinton’s term had confirmed the popular (though
historically inaccurate) notion that a lot of end-of-term pardoning was to be
expected, and the Counsel to the President was visited by a parade of
aspiring pardon applicants and their lawyers. 132 Bush’s White House
advisers made many of the same mistakes that Clinton’s did, and were
saved from greater embarrassment only by the President’s own buttoned-up
conservatism and general parsimony. Bush later wrote that he had been
“frustrated” and “disgusted” by the “last-minute frenzy” of pardon requests,
and that he “came to see the massive injustice” of a system that gave special
access to people who had “connections to the president.” 133 A batch of
Bush’s term. See, e.g., Richard Schmitt, Clemency Bids Backing Up for Bush; More than
3,000 Petitions by Federal Inmates Are Pending, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2007, at A15.
130
See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Felons Seeking Bush Pardon Near a Record, N.Y. TIMES,
July 19, 2008, at A1.
131
See Savage, supra note 128, at A1 (describing pardons granted to clients represented
by former lawyers in Bush White House Counsel’s office); Laird, supra note 128, at 30P
(describing December 17, 2008, meeting at White House between Iowa delegation
supporting clemency for Prior and White House Counsel Fred Fielding); Schulte, supra note
128, at 1 (same).
132
Id. (“A huge backlog at the Justice Department’s pardon review office combined with
the relatively small number of clemency grants by recent presidents . . . encourages people to
try to end-run the process—to try to cheat, for lack of a better word, to gain access to the
White House directly,” quoting pardon scholar P.S. Ruckman).
133
See GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 104 (2010):
One of the biggest surprises of my presidency was the flood of pardon requests at the end. I
could not believe the number of people who pulled me aside to suggest that a friend or former
colleague deserved a pardon. At first I was frustrated. Then I was disgusted. I came to see the
massive injustice in the system. If you had connections to the president, you could insert your
case into the last-minute frenzy. Otherwise, you had to wait for the Justice Department to
conduct a review and make a recommendation. In my final weeks in office, I resolved that I
would not pardon anyone who went outside the formal channels.

President Bush recounted how he had been particularly vexed by Vice President Cheney’s
intense lobbying in behalf of Scooter Libby, id. at 104-05, and how he had advised his
successor about how to deal with pardons so as to avoid such personally difficult situations:
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pardons immediately before Christmas created a stir when the President
tried to revoke one of them the day after it was announced,134 but his final
grants were decidedly anticlimactic. When it became clear at noon on
January 20, 2009 that the two sentence commutations issued the previous
day 135 was the extent of the final pardoning, dozens of individuals whose
hopes had been raised by an unusually accessible White House staff were
bitterly disappointed.
The paucity of grants at the end of President Bush’s term, like the
torrent of grants at the end of President Clinton’s, can be attributed to a
chronically dysfunctional pardon advisory system in the Justice
Department, a system dominated by prosecutors that produces few
favorable recommendations, and that serves its own institutional interest
rather than that of the presidency. Clinton dealt with that problem by
staffing pardons in the White House. Bush did not deal with it at all. In
both cases, at the end of the term there were very few favorable
recommendations from the pardon bureaucracy for the president to act
upon. The difference in the final production of pardons for the two
presidents is attributable to their very different personal inclinations to
dispense forgiveness, inclinations already in evidence during their
respective days as governor.
To his credit, unlike Clinton, Bush appears to have been genuinely
offended by the undemocratic cronyism of the pardon end-game. But it was
his own early decision not to question or give direction to the Justice
Department in pardon matters that led to what he described as a “massive
injustice” in the system, just as President Clinton's similar neglect of his
power had led to similar chaos and unfairness eight years before. In the
end, if Bush restrained himself in a way that Clinton did not, he was just as
“On the ride up Pennsylvania Avenue on Inauguration Day, I told Barack Obama about my
frustrations with the pardon system. I gave him a suggestion: announce a pardon policy
early on, and stick to it.” Id. at 105.
Nancy Pelosi, a fellow passenger in the presidential limousine, gave her version of the
conversation in an interview with CNN’s Larry King, reporting that Bush said he was “very
proud” of not issuing pardons to the politically well-connected. “He said people who have
gotten pardons are usually people who have influence or know friends in high places,” a
route that is “not available to ordinary people,” Pelosi said. “He thought that there was more
access for some than others and he was not going to do any.” Josh Meyer, Bush Rejected
Pardons for Big-Name Applicants, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 2009, at 10.
134
See David Stout & Eric Lichtblau, Pardon Lasts Just One Day for Developer in
Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008, at A14 (stating that White House directed Pardon
Attorney not to execute document conveying pardon to Isaac Robert Toussie, apparently
because he had made substantial campaign contributions to the Republican Party).
Questions about whether the Toussie pardon had already become effective and therefore
could not be revoked were unresolved at the time President Bush left office.
135
See Savage, Felons Seeking Bush Pardon Near Record, supra note 130, at A1.
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much at fault for treating pardon as a political third rail throughout his
presidency, in the end a self-fulfilling prophecy for both men.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR RENEWAL
An authority on the pardon power suggested twenty years ago that the
time might have come for pardon “silently to fade away—like collar
buttons, [its] usefulness at an end.” 136 There is no question that pardon has
faded, but it is not for lack of usefulness. Recent presidents allowed the
power to fall into disuse apparently because they saw nothing to be gained
by pardoning that was not outweighed by the possibility of making a
politically damaging mistake. The final section of this paper argues that
President Obama ought not wait to use his power, if only to avoid
embarrassment in a final summing up. It then suggests some ways he can
minimize the risk pardoning entails.
A. THE CONTEMPORARY USEFULNESS OF PARDON

Pardon remains relevant and useful today for three purposes:
• to do justice in particular cases;
• to communicate the president’s priorities within the executive
branch; and
• to advance the president’s policy agenda with Congress and the
public.
History teaches that the demand for clemency increases when the legal
system lacks other mechanisms for delivering individualized justice,
recognizing changed circumstances, and correcting errors and inequities.
Clemency is less necessary, and is therefore less justifiable, when mercy
“shines in the code.” 137 But in the twenty years since the federal sentencing
guidelines system took effect, the president’s power to commute has been
invoked frequently because of the severity of mandatory prison terms,
because federal courts have limited ability to individualize sentences or
revise a sentence once imposed, 138 and because statutory early release

136

MOORE, supra note 16, at 83.
See BECCARIA, supra note 99.
138
See, e.g., Petition for Commutation of Sentence from Hamedah Hasan, available at
http://www.dearmrpresidentyesyoucan.org/ (documenting broad support for clemency
request from woman who has served sixteen years of a twenty-seven-year sentence for her
role in a drug-trafficking scheme; request denied in 2005); United States v. Harvey, supra
note 20, 946 F.2d at 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1991) (expressing support for trial judge’s
recommendation that life sentence for drug trafficking be commuted after fifteen years).
Hasan’s first clemency petition was denied by President Bush in 2008, as was Harvey’s. Mr.
Harvey filed a second clemency petition in March 2010. See Mimi Hall, Convict Petitions
137
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mechanisms have either been repealed or allowed to atrophy. 139 Thus, the
president’s personal intervention in a prisoner’s case through the pardon
power not only benefits the particular individual, it also reassures the public
that the legal system is capable of just and moral application. While
presidents “ought not invoke the pardon power to convert the Presidency
into a legislature of one,” 140 and while clemency is by its nature somewhat
arbitrary, at least until laws are reformed and workable statutory relief
mechanisms adopted, there is a place for clemency. 141
After the court-imposed sentence has been served, pardon plays an
important role in offender reentry and reintegration. With the proliferation
of collateral consequences and easy access to criminal history information,
the overwhelming majority of people convicted of a crime in America have
no realistic hope of ever satisfying their debt to society. 142 The collateral

Obama to Reduce Crack Penalty, USA TODAY, Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/washington/2010-04-27-clemency_N.htm.
139
STEPHEN R. SADY & LYNN DEFFEBACH, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, THE SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, AND
THE NEED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING AMELIORATIVE STATUTES TO ADDRESS
UNWARRANTED AND UNAUTHORIZED OVER-INCARCERATION (2008), available at
http://www.rashkind.com/alternatives/dir_04/Sady_Over-Incarceration.pdf (prepared for the
U.S. Sentencing Commission Symposium on Alternatives to Incarceration).
140
Daniel J. Freed & Steven L. Chanenson, Pardon Power and Sentencing Policy, 13
FED. SENT’G REP. 119, 124 (2001).
141
See HAY, supra note 11, at 44 (describing pardon as “erratic and capricious, but a
useful palliative until Parliament reformed the law in the 19th century”). The American Law
Institute is considering a recommendation that jurisdictions make provisions for a “second
look” at lengthy determinate sentences under certain circumstances. See Model Penal Code:
Sentencing, Discussion Draft # 3, §§ 305.6, 305.7 (Mar. 29, 2010); Richard F. Frase, Second
Look Provisions in the Proposed Model Penal Code Revisions, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 194
(2009).
142
Particularly since 9/11, laws excluding people with a criminal record from jobs and
other opportunities have proliferated, and decisionmakers have become more risk-averse.
Background checks have become the norm for employers, landlords, and other decisionmakers: there are now more than 600 companies engaged in the business of backgrounding,
and many states have begun to make their court records available for a fee on the internet.
See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, SECOND CHANCES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION AND REENTRY STRATEGIES3645 (2007), available at http://www.pardonlaw.com/materials/rev_2ndchance(3).pdf
(reporting on access to and use of criminal records, and on representation relating to
collateral consequences); see also Fact Sheet No. 16, Employment Background Checks: A
Jobseekers Guide, PRIVACY RTS CLEARINGHOUSE, April 2010, http://www.privacyrights.org/
fs/fs16-bck.htm. Surprising as it may seem, in some states a federal offender cannot exercise
basic civil rights, including the right to vote, without a presidential pardon. As a result of
this web of “invisible punishment,” most people convicted of a crime in America are
deprived of the tools necessary to reestablish themselves as law-abiding and productive
members of the free community. The fact that so many of this population are AfricanAmerican only aggravates the phenomenon that has been described as “internal exile.” See

1206

MARGARET COLGATE LOVE

[Vol. 100

consequences of conviction operate as continuing punishment, particularly
in an era of pervasive background checking, and a just system must afford
deserving individuals some way of alleviating them. In the federal system,
pardon is the only way for a federal offender to overcome the legal
disabilities and stigma of conviction, since there is no authority for judicial
expungement or sealing of a criminal record even for a first-time offender.
For example, pardon provides the only way federal felony offenders can
regain firearms privileges, avoid deportation, and qualify for an array of
licenses and benefits under state and federal law. 143 Until some alternative
way is found to give federal offenders a way to satisfy their debt to society,
there is a place for pardon.
Within the executive branch, pardon can serve as a useful policy and
management tool to help the president carry out his constitutional
obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, in two ways.
First, the pardon caseload provides a unique birds-eye view of how the
federal justice system is being administered, revealing where particular laws
or enforcement policies are overly harsh, and where prosecutorial discretion
is being unwisely exercised. In addition, a grant of clemency allows the
president to intercede directly to change the outcome of a particular case,
thereby sending a very direct and powerful message about how he wishes
the law to be enforced by his appointees in the future. The “extraordinary
potential for arbitrariness” that some see as an argument against pardon 144
can be turned on its head: a clemency program administered rigorously at a
national level, in which decision-making is structured and explained, may
be the best corrective for the sort of systemic arbitrariness that can result
from unchecked prosecutorial discretion. In this fashion, pardon can
address the disparity and overreaching that many believe have
compromised the integrity of the federal justice system in recent years. In
turn, prosecutors can be challenged to regard clemency as something that
can be useful to them, rather than a threat to their independence or a sign of
weak resolve. 145 Clemency can be a useful management tool for prison
Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need For Restrictions on Collateral
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 157 (1999); see also Jeremy
Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT:
THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 16 (Meda Chesney-Lind & Marc Mauer eds.,
2002); KELLY SALZMANN & MARGARET LOVE, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, INTERNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN
FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS, (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/
cecs/internalexile.pdf.
143
See Love, supra note 8, at 1722-23; Salzmann & Love, supra note 142, at 45-46.
144
Freed & Chanenson, supra note 140, at 123.
145
See Zlotnick, supra note 106 (analyzing five 2000 Clinton commutations where
rationale for grant served prosecutors’ interests, including correction of a mistake).
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administrators as well, rewarding good conduct and accomplishment by
prisoners, and even easing the strain on prison budgets where prisoners are
elderly or infirm, and can be taken care of more efficiently and effectively
in the free community. A grant of executive clemency may be instructive to
prison officials in interpreting their responsibilities under one or another of
the early release mechanisms at their disposal.
As a policy tool, “systematic pardons or exemplary commutations
[may] prompt debate or motivate a recalcitrant Congress.” 146 By pointing
out flaws in the legal system, pardon can influence attitudes, and build
consensus for change. In a very real way, pardon’s highest purpose is to
accomplish its own demise. 147 If a particular grant illustrates some systemwide problem, as opposed to an exceptional situation not likely to recur,
pardon’s anecdotal approach can effectively demonstrate the need for
reform, and encourage public support for it. 148 Even in the heyday of
parole, “changed public opinion after a period of severe penalties” was
recognized as a respectable basis for the use of the pardon power.149 If a
judicious use of commutations can draw out support for more flexibility in
sentencing laws, post-sentence pardons can illustrate the need for
administrative or judicial relief mechanisms to avoid or mitigate collateral
legal penalties and the stigma of conviction.150
Finally, apart from its role in encouraging law reform, pardon can
educate the public about the justice system and tell good news by
recognizing and rewarding criminal justice success stories. When a drug

146

Freed & Chanenson, supra note 140, at 124.
The 1939 Justice Department survey of release procedures in the United States
pointed out that pardon was the “direct or collateral ancestor of most [statutory release
procedures].” 3 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 59, at 295. In addition,
pardon was “the tool by which many of the most important reforms in the substantive
criminal law have been introduced.” Id.
148
The Scooter Libby commutation is a reminder of how powerfully the president can
speak from this bully pulpit. The fact that President Bush found Mr. Libby’s thirty-month
sentence “excessively harsh” (even though it was entirely legal) may influence courts
looking at other similar cases, embolden defenders arguing for leniency, and encourage the
United States Sentencing Commission to rethink its guidelines. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston,
Rita, Citing Libby Order, Seeks Rehearing, SCOTUSBLOG, July 16, 2007,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/07/rita-citing-libby-order-seeks-rehearing/. While the
Libby grant itself is unlikely to persuade Congress or the courts that prison terms for
nonviolent offenses should be reduced, a more systematic use of the power in less politically
charged cases might do so.
149
3 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 59, at 299.
150
See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Paterson Rewards Redemption with a Pardon, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 2010, at A29 (quoting statement of Governor Paterson describing the pardon of
highly-recommended Chinese immigrant as “the opportunity to make a forceful statement
about the harsh inequity and rigidity of the immigration laws”).
147
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addict turns his life around and becomes a productive member of the
community or a thief pays restitution to her victims and dedicates her life to
serving others, a grant of pardon emphasizes the system’s capacity to
encourage rehabilitation and its redemptive goals. Not since the nineteenth
century has pardon been as relevant from both a moral and practical point
of view, for those who make and apply the law, as well as for those
convicted of breaking it. No one should be fooled into thinking otherwise
by the fact that the power has in recent years been used so sparingly and
irregularly.
B. REINVIGORATING THE PARDON PROCESS

It is clear that the administrative process that facilitated presidential
pardoning from the Civil War until the 1980s is broken. Assuming a desire
by the president to make productive use of the power, the process for
administering it must be reformed to make it:
• accessible to ordinary people and guided by clear standards, in
order to secure and maintain public confidence;
• well-funded and competently staffed, in order to produce
thorough and reliable advice; and
• independent and authoritative, in order to command the respect of
executive officials and Congress.
The legitimacy of the president’s use of the pardon power has
historically depended upon its regular administration and availability to
ordinary people. This legitimacy may be called into question when grants
are made outside of official channels to political allies whose cases are
indistinguishable from those without the same special access151 or to people
whose cases have fortuitously attracted media attention. Similarly, public
confidence is shaken when those responsible for administering the power
are seen as blocking access to it, or having an effective veto power over
presidential actions.152 It is for this reason that some have questioned
151

See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Bush Rationale on Libby Stirs Legal Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 2007, at A1 (“In commuting I. Lewis Libby’s 30-month prison sentence on Monday,
President Bush drew on the same array of arguments about the federal sentencing system
often made by defense lawyers—and routinely and strenuously opposed by his own Justice
Department.”); see also George W. Bush, supra note 126 (describing Libby’s thirty-month
prison term “excessive” for “a first-time offender with years of exceptional public service”).
152
See Samuel T. Morison, Opinion, A No-Pardon Justice Department, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
6, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/06/opinion/la-oew-morison-pardon-20101106
(“[T]he bureaucratic managers of the Justice Department's clemency program continue to
churn out a steady stream of almost uniformly negative advice, in a politically calculated
attempt to restrain (rather than inform) the president's exercise of discretion.”).
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whether the pardon power can play a useful part in the justice system as
long as it is controlled by the Justice Department, which is said to have a
built-in conflict of interest. 153 Some have suggested that the White House
should administer the power itself. Others have suggested that the president
should be advised in pardon matters by an independent board like those in
many states. 154
It is not clear that such a radical restructuring is necessary. History
teaches that the Justice Department can excel at managing the pardon power
notwithstanding its responsibility for prosecuting cases, and indeed that
prosecutors need not fear that pardon will denigrate the results of their
work. Ensuring a central role for those officially responsible for the
underlying criminal case gives the president access to information about the
case, helps insulate the president from political pressure and importuning,
and maximizes the chances that pardon would advance the administration’s
law enforcement and criminal justice agenda.
At the same time, experience since the 1980s has shown that tying the
pardon advisory function so closely to the interests of prosecutors has made
it hard to provide the objectivity that the president needs to exercise the
power wisely and responsibly. The president needs an advisor who has
some degree of independence from those who prosecuted the underlying
criminal case, who can bring to bear a different policy perspective and
different values, and whose independent political accountability can provide
the president a measure of protection from public criticism. For over a
century that advisor was the attorney general, who combines the roles of
chief law enforcement officer and political counselor. Since the late 1990s,
the Department’s clemency advisory function has served the institutional
interests of prosecutors rather those of the presidency.
One possibility going forward is for the president to restore the
attorney general to a central role in the pardon process and to appoint his

153

See, e.g., Daniel T. Kobil, Reviving Presidential Clemency in Cases of “Unfortunate
Guilt,” 21 FED SENT’G REP. 160, 163 (2009) (“Given the prosecutorial responsibilities of the
Justice Department, there is a conflict of interest present when its attorneys must also serve
as the gatekeepers for clemency.”); Evan P. Schultz, Does the Fox Control Pardons in the
Henhouse?, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 177, 178 (2001) (“The pardon process seems to have been
captured by the very prosecutors who run our inevitably flawed criminal justice system.”).
154
See Barkow, supra note 5, at 157 (stating that administrative clemency boards can
“take the heat for decisions that turn out badly”); Kobil, supra note 153, at 163 (“[T]he
president should look for advice to either a body of professionals charged with the sole task
of reviewing clemency requests, or to a group of volunteers appointed because of their
expertise . . . .”). A recent example is Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm’s use of a
citizens’ advisory board in commuting prison sentences. See Liedel, supra note 5, at A28
(“Prisoner commutations have been rare and safe for public”). State clemency boards are
described in RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 18-38.
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own pardon attorney. 155 Another possibility is to install a permanent
clemency advisory board similar to those used on an ad hoc basis by
Presidents Coolidge, Truman, and Ford. 156 In any case, the president and
attorney general need to encourage the U.S. Attorneys to regard pardon as
helpful rather than threatening to their work, and invite them to support
worthy pardon cases.
The president ought also to make public his clemency policy and the
standards for favorable consideration of clemency applications, and return
to a practice of prompt and generous pardoning: “[i]nactivity can be just as
politically risky as granting a questionable pardon,” since “observers
become more suspicious and skeptical of those lucky few who are
pardoned.” 157 Critics of pardoning have pointed to its reliance on
“unstructured, unexplained discretion,” 158 but this is not inevitable. The
president could establish a policy of disclosure after a clemency case has
been finally acted upon, to introduce a degree of accountability into the
pardon process, and consider returning to the pre-1931 practice of giving
reasons for each grant, as many governors do. 159 In order to divert some of
the commutation caseload, he could direct the attorney general to make
maximum use of statutory alternatives to clemency. 160 Staffing may be a

155
See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Guarding the Integrity of the Clemency Power, 13 FED.
SENT’G REP. 180, 181-82 (2001) (stating that responsibility for staffing clemency cases
should remain in the Justice Department, but program should be restructured so as to restore
attorney general’s role in process). The president might also choose to emulate President
Cleveland in his second term, and work directly with the pardon attorney. See supra pp.
113-14.
156
See 1924 ATT’Y GEN. REP. 387 (1924), discussed in HUMBERT, supra note 13, at 94
(board appointed to consider cases prosecuted under wartime emergency authorities that
pardon attorney staff “did not have time to investigate properly”); Exec. Order 9814, 11 Fed.
Reg. 14,645 (1946) (order creating board to consider pardons for Selective Service Act
violators after World War II); U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BD., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
(1975) (administration of President Ford’s Vietnam amnesty proclamation); see also Daniel
Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69
TEX. L. REV. 569, 622 (1991) (recommending bifurcated system, involving appointed board
to consider and make recommendations in “ordinary” pardon cases, leaving the president
unconstrained to consider more “political” uses of the power).
157
CROUCH, supra note 14, at 24. Prior to the Reagan Administration, presidents acted
favorably on at least 30% of the petitions filed. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
158
Freed & Chanenson, supra note 140, at 124.
159
See, e.g., VIRGINIA GOVERNOR’S ANNUAL REPORTS TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1974Present) available at http://leg2.state.va.us/DLS/h&sdocs.nsf/Search+All+Published/
?SearchView&SearchOrder=4&query=clemency (“List of Pardons, Commutations,
Reprieves, and Other Forms of Executive Clemency,” including reasons for granting pardon
in each case).
160
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i) (2006) (granting court authority to reduce
sentence on motion of the Bureau of Prisons if “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
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concern if a reinvigorated pardon power turns out to be wildly popular,
though it is instructive to recall that for many years hundreds of clemency
cases were capably handled each year by a very small staff. 161
Finally, the president should take advantage of clemency’s strategic
potential, by recognizing particularly harsh mandatory sentences, mitigating
unwarranted disparity among codefendants, giving retroactive effect to
changes in the law, sending home prisoners who are seriously ill or elderly,
and restoring rights to individuals who have a need for relief from some
specific collateral penalty, such as deportation. A senior attorney in the
White House Counsel’s office should be assigned to review the Justice
Department’s clemency recommendations and advise the president on
pardon matters with larger policy goals in mind, and the president should
schedule regular opportunities to review and act on clemency requests. The
White House should publicize clemency grants and the reasons for each
one, putting a human face on the individuals benefiting from the president’s
mercy. None of this can happen if there is not a prior decision to take
pardoning and the pardon process seriously. At this writing, things do not
look hopeful. 162
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout our nation’s history, the president’s pardon power has
been used generously and regularly, to correct systemic injustices and to
warrant such a reduction); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4) (2006) (granting authority to deport certain
non-citizen prisoners).
161
See supra note 49. It has been customary since the early 1990s for the pardon
attorney to prepare very cursory reports in cases deemed meritless and otherwise unworthy
of the president’s attention. During the Obama presidency, the author understands that the
pardon attorney has stopped sending forward reports in most commutations, providing little
more than the name and offense of clemency applicants proposed for denial. It is obviously
difficult for the president to reach an independent assessment of the merits of a clemency
case without at least some report.
162
According to news reports, discussions about restructuring the pardon process took
place in the Justice Department and White House during the early months of the Obama
Administration, but proposal for thoroughgoing reforms were shelved after the two highranking officials interested in the subject left the administration. See Joe Palazzolo, Despite
Efforts, Pardon System Still Unchanged, MAIN JUSTICE, Apr. 20, 2010,
http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/04/20/despite-efforts-pardons-system-still-unchanged/.
Meanwhile, calls for reform of the pardon process have come even from the Supreme Court.
See Josh Gerstein, Justice Kennedy Prods Obama to Commute Sentences, POLITICO, Mar. 30,
2010, http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0310/Justice_Kennedy_prods_Obama_to
_commute_sentences.html; see also Kenneth Lee, Obama Should Exercise the Pardon
Power, NAT’L L.J., April 12, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?
id=1202447826608&Obama_should_exercise_the_pardon_power&hbxlogin=1;
Margaret
Colgate Love, Looking for the Pardon Power? Try the Supreme Court, ACSBLOG, Apr. 14,
2010, http://www.acslaw.org/node/15863.
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advance the executive’s policy goals. Since 1980, however, presidential
pardoning has fallen on hard times, its benign purposes frustrated by
politicians’ fear of making a mistake and subverted by unfairness in the
way pardons are granted. Much responsibility for the disuse and disrepute
into which a once-proud and useful institution of government has fallen
must be laid at the door of the Justice Department, which during the past
two administrations failed in its responsibilities as steward of the power,
exposing the president to embarrassment and the power to abuse. Another
president should not be compelled to accept such poor service. That said,
considering the criticism leveled against Bill Clinton’s excesses and George
Bush’s parsimony, it is little wonder that Barack Obama has yet to take this
constitutional power seriously. Yet pardon has important uses in the federal
justice system, and recent experience has shown that a president who fails
to pardon regularly throughout his term will have difficulty dealing with
pent-up demand at its conclusion. And so President Obama would be welladvised to get curious soon about a constitutional power that is uniquely
his, which promises so much but of late has delivered so little.

